Winner determination in combinatorial auction generalizations
Proceedings of the first international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems: part 1
Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
An Algorithm for Multi-Unit Combinatorial Auctions
Proceedings of the Seventeenth National Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Twelfth Conference on Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence
An algorithm for optimal winner determination in combinatorial auctions
IJCAI'99 Proceedings of the 16th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence - Volume 1
Taming the computational complexity of combinatorial auctions: optimal and approximate approaches
IJCAI'99 Proceedings of the 16th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence - Volume 1
Robust multi-unit auction protocol against false-name bids
IJCAI'01 Proceedings of the 17th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 2
Bundle design in robust combinatorial auction protocol against false-name bids
IJCAI'01 Proceedings of the 17th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 2
Evolutionary bandwidth allocation in reservation-based networks with Vickrey auctions
International Journal of Intelligent Information and Database Systems
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False-name bids and shill bids pose an emerging problem for auctions. To solve the problem, we propose a new method for finding shill bid in order to avoid them. Our algorithm can judge whether there might be a shill bid from the results of the bidding procedure. Further, in this paper, we propose an improved method, which can dramatically reduce the computational cost. The results demonstrate that the proposed method successfully reduces the computational cost needed to find shill bids. The contribution of our work is in the integration of the theory and detecting fraud in combinatorial auctions.