Winner determination in combinatorial auction generalizations
Proceedings of the first international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems: part 1
Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
An Algorithm for Multi-Unit Combinatorial Auctions
Proceedings of the Seventeenth National Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Twelfth Conference on Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence
Issues in computational Vickrey auctions
International Journal of Electronic Commerce - Special issue: Intelligent agents for electronic commerce
An algorithm for optimal winner determination in combinatorial auctions
IJCAI'99 Proceedings of the 16th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence - Volume 1
Taming the computational complexity of combinatorial auctions: optimal and approximate approaches
IJCAI'99 Proceedings of the 16th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence - Volume 1
Robust multi-unit auction protocol against false-name bids
IJCAI'01 Proceedings of the 17th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 2
Bundle design in robust combinatorial auction protocol against false-name bids
IJCAI'01 Proceedings of the 17th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 2
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This paper presents a method for discovering and detecting shill bids in combinatorial auctions. Combinatorial auctions have been studied very widely. The Generalized Vickrey Auction (GVA) is one of the most important combinatorial auctions because it can satisfy the strategy-proof property and Pareto efficiency. As Yokoo et al. pointed out, false-name bids and shill bids pose an emerging problem for auctions, since on the Internet it is easy to establish different e-mail addresses and accounts for auction sites. Yokoo et al. proved that GVA cannot satisfy the false-name-proof property. Moreover, they proved that there is no auction protocol that can satisfy all three of the above major properties. Their approach concentrates on designing new mechanisms. As a new approach against shill-bids, in this paper, we propose a method for finding shill bids with the GVA in order to avoid them. Our algorithm can judge whether there might be a shill bid from the results of the GVA's procedure. However, a straightforward way to detect shill bids requires an exponential amount of computing power because we need to check all possible combinations of bidders. Therefore, in this paper we propose an improved method for finding a shill bidder. The method is based on winning bidders, which can dramatically reduce the computational cost. The results demonstrate that the proposed method successfully reduces the computational cost needed to find shill bids. The contribution of our work is in the integration of the theory and detecting fraud in combinatorial auctions.