Robust combinatorial auction protocol against false-name bids.
Artificial Intelligence
Combinatorial auctions with decreasing marginal utilities
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM conference on Electronic Commerce
Proceedings of the 5th Pacific Rim International Workshop on Multi Agents: Intelligent Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
A robust open ascending-price multi-unit auction protocol against false-name bids
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
A false-name-proof double auction protocol for arbitrary evaluation values
AAMAS '03 Proceedings of the second international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
AAMAS '03 Proceedings of the second international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Robust Double Auction Protocol against False-Name Bids
ICDCS '01 Proceedings of the The 21st International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems
Protocol/Mechanism Design for Cooperation/Competition
AAMAS '04 Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1
A robust open ascending-price multi-unit auction protocol against false-name bids
Decision Support Systems - Special issue: The fourth ACM conference on electronic commerce
Robust double auction protocol against false-name bids
Decision Support Systems - Special issue: Decision theory and game theory in agent design
Multi-bidding Strategy in Sponsored Keyword Auction
FAW '08 Proceedings of the 2nd annual international workshop on Frontiers in Algorithmics
IJCAI'03 Proceedings of the 18th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence
Robust multi-unit auction protocol against false-name bids
IJCAI'01 Proceedings of the 17th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 2
Bundle design in robust combinatorial auction protocol against false-name bids
IJCAI'01 Proceedings of the 17th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 2
A robust open ascending-price multi-unit auction protocol against false-name bids
Decision Support Systems - Special issue: The fourth ACM conference on electronic commerce
UAI'01 Proceedings of the Seventeenth conference on Uncertainty in artificial intelligence
Multi-bidding strategy in sponsored search auctions
Journal of Combinatorial Optimization
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The purpose of this paper is to analyze a collective decision making problem in an open, dynamic environment, such as the Internet. More specifically, we study a class of mechanism design problems where the designer of a mechanism cannot completely identify the participants (agents) of the mechanism. A typical example of such a situation is Internet auctions.The main contributions of this paper are as follows: 1) We develop a formal model of a mechanism design problem in which false-name declarations are possible, and prove that the revelation principle still holds in this model.2) When false-name declarations and hiding are possible, we show that there exists no auction protocol that achieves Pareto efficient allocations in a dominant strategy equilibrium for all cases.3) We show a sufficient condition where the Clarke mechanism is robust against false-name declarations (the concavity of the maximal total utility of agents).