AAAI '99/IAAI '99 Proceedings of the sixteenth national conference on Artificial intelligence and the eleventh Innovative applications of artificial intelligence conference innovative applications of artificial intelligence
ICDCS '00 Proceedings of the The 20th International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems ( ICDCS 2000)
Truthful auctions for pricing search keywords
EC '06 Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Greedy bidding strategies for keyword auctions
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Asymptotically optimal repeated auctions for sponsored search
Proceedings of the ninth international conference on Electronic commerce
Vindictive bidding in keyword auctions
Proceedings of the ninth international conference on Electronic commerce
Forward looking Nash equilibrium for keyword auction
Information Processing Letters
Properties of Symmetric Incentive Compatible Auctions
COCOON '07 Proceedings of the 13th Annual international conference on Computing and Combinatorics
Multi-bidding Strategy in Sponsored Keyword Auction
FAW '08 Proceedings of the 2nd annual international workshop on Frontiers in Algorithmics
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The generalized second price auction has recently become a much studied model for sponsored search auctions for Internet advertisement. Though it is known not to be incentive compatible, properties of its pure Nash equilibria have been well characterized under the single bidding strategy of each bidder.In this paper, we study the properties of pure Nash equilibria of the generalized second price auction when each bidder is allowed to submit more than one bid. This multi-bidding strategy is noted to have been adopted by companies for keyword advertisements on search engines. In consideration of the pure Nash equilibria, we completely characterize conditions on the number of selling slots for a pure Nash equilibrium to exist, assuming all the advertisers are allowed to use multi-bidding strategies or only one advertiser will use a multi-bidding strategy.Our findings reveal interesting properties of limitations and potentials of the generalized second price auction for the sponsored search market.