A new polynomial-time algorithm for linear programming
Combinatorica
Truthful auctions for pricing search keywords
EC '06 Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
An analysis of alternative slot auction designs for sponsored search
EC '06 Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Greedy bidding strategies for keyword auctions
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Multi-bidding Strategy in Sponsored Keyword Auction
FAW '08 Proceedings of the 2nd annual international workshop on Frontiers in Algorithmics
Spiteful bidding in sealed-bid auctions
IJCAI'07 Proceedings of the 20th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence
Cooperative or vindictive: bidding strategies in sponsored search auction
WINE'07 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Internet and network economics
Mechanism design for multi-slot ads auction in sponsored search markets
FAW'10 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Frontiers in algorithmics
Discrete strategies in keyword auctions and their inefficiency for locally aware bidders
WINE'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Internet and network economics
Multi-bidding strategy in sponsored search auctions
Journal of Combinatorial Optimization
Sponsored search auctions: an overview of research with emphasis on game theoretic aspects
Electronic Commerce Research
Co-evolution-based mechanism design for sponsored search advertising
Electronic Commerce Research and Applications
Convergence analysis for weighted joint strategy fictitious play in generalized second price auction
WINE'12 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Predicting advertiser bidding behaviors in sponsored search by rationality modeling
Proceedings of the 22nd international conference on World Wide Web
Bidding behaviors for a keyword auction in a sealed-bid environment
Decision Support Systems
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We study vindictive bidding, a strategic bidding behavior in keyword auctions where a bidder forces his competitor to pay more without affecting his own payment. We show that most Nash equilibria (NE) are vulnerable to vindictive bidding and are thus unstable. There always exists a pure strategy Nash equilibrium (PSNE) if there is only one pair of vindictive players; however PSNE may not exist when there are at least three players who are all vindictive with each other. Given the set of vindictive bidding pairs, we show how to compute a PSNE if one exists. Preliminary data analysis suggests that vindictive bidding is prevalent in real-world keyword auctions. As an ongoing work, we also propose several interesting open problems related to vindictive bidding.