Mechanism design for multi-slot ads auction in sponsored search markets

Authors:
Xiaotie Deng;Yang Sun;Ming Yin;Yunhong Zhou
Affiliations:
Department of Computer Science, City University of Hong Kong;Department of Computer Science, City University of Hong Kong;School of Software, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China;Baidu Research, Beijing, China
Venue:
FAW'10 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Frontiers in algorithmics
Year:
2010

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Abstract

In this paper, we study pricing models for multi-slot advertisements, where advertisers can bid to place links to their sales webpages at one or multiple slots on a webpage, called the multi-slot AD auction problem. We develop and analyze several important mechanisms, including the VCG mechanism for multi-slot ads auction, the optimal social welfare solution, as well as two weighted GSP-like protocols (mixed and hybrid). Furthermore, we consider that forward-looking Nash equilibrium and prove its existence in the weighted GSP-like pricing protocols. We prove properties and compare revenue of those different pricing models via analysis and simulation.