On incentive compatible competitive selection protocol

Authors:
Xi Chen;Xiaotie Deng;Becky Jie Liu
Affiliations:
Department of Computer Science, Tsinghua University;Department of Computer Science, City University of Hong Kong;Department of Computer Science, City University of Hong Kong
Venue:
COCOON'06 Proceedings of the 12th annual international conference on Computing and Combinatorics
Year:
2006

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Abstract

The selection problem of m highest ranked out of n candidates is considered for a model while the relative ranking of two candidates is obtained through their pairwise comparison. Deviating from the standard model, it is assumed in this article that the outcome of a pairwise comparison may be manipulated by the two participants. The higher ranked party may intentionally lose to the lower ranked party in order to gain group benefit. We discuss incentive compatible mechanism design issues for such scenarios and develop both possibility and impossibility results.