Unconditional competitive auctions with copy and budget constraints

Authors:
Tian-Ming Bu;Qi Qi;Aries Wei Sun
Affiliations:
Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Intelligent Information Processing Laboratory, Fudan University, Shanghai, P.R. China;Department of Computer Science, City University of Hong Kong, Kowloon, SAR, Hong Kong;Department of Computer Science, City University of Hong Kong, Kowloon, SAR, Hong Kong
Venue:
WINE'06 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Year:
2006

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Abstract

This paper investigates a new auction model in which bidders have both copy and budget constraints. The new model has extensive and interesting applications in auctions of online ad-words, software licenses, etc. We consider the following problem: Suppose all the participators are rational, how to allocate the objects at what price so as to guarantee auctioneer's high revenue, and how high it is. We introduce a new kind of mechanisms called win-win mechanisms and present the notion of unconditional competitive auctions. A notably interesting property of win-win mechanisms is that each bidder's self-interested strategy brings better utility not only to himself but also to the auctioneer. Then we present win-win mechanisms for multi-unit auctions with copy and budget constraints. We prove that these auctions are unconditional competitive under the situation of both limited and unlimited supply.