Properties of symmetric incentive compatible auctions

Authors:
Xiaotie Deng;Kazuo Iwama;Qi Qi;Aries Wei Sun;Toyotaka Tasaka
Affiliations:
Department of Computer Science, City University of Hong Kong;School of Informatics, Kyoto University, Japan;Department of Computer Science, City University of Hong Kong;Department of Computer Science, City University of Hong Kong;School of Informatics, Kyoto University, Japan
Venue:
COCOON'07 Proceedings of the 13th annual international conference on Computing and Combinatorics
Year:
2007

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Abstract

We formalize the definition of symmetric auctions to study fundamental properties of incentive compatible auction protocols. We characterize such auction protocols for those with a fixed number of items to sell and study some important properties of those with an indefinite number of sales.