Competitive auctions and digital goods
SODA '01 Proceedings of the twelfth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Competitive generalized auctions
STOC '02 Proceedings of the thiry-fourth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Truthful approximation mechanisms for restricted combinatorial auctions: extended abstract
Eighteenth national conference on Artificial intelligence
Envy-free auctions for digital goods
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Multi-unit auctions with budget-constrained bidders
Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Collusion-resistant mechanisms for single-parameter agents
SODA '05 Proceedings of the sixteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
SODA '05 Proceedings of the sixteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
On profit-maximizing envy-free pricing
SODA '05 Proceedings of the sixteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
AdWords and Generalized On-line Matching
FOCS '05 Proceedings of the 46th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Mechanism Design via Machine Learning
FOCS '05 Proceedings of the 46th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Revenue maximization when bidders have budgets
SODA '06 Proceedings of the seventeenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithm
Revenue maximization when bidders have budgets
SODA '06 Proceedings of the seventeenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithm
An efficient mechanism for auctioning alternative paths
GameNets '06 Proceeding from the 2006 workshop on Game theory for communications and networks
Algorithmic pricing via virtual valuations
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Designing and learning optimal finite support auctions
SODA '07 Proceedings of the eighteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Mechanism design, machine learning, and pricing problems
ACM SIGecom Exchanges
A combinatorial allocation mechanism with penalties for banner advertising
Proceedings of the 17th international conference on World Wide Web
A Knapsack Secretary Problem with Applications
APPROX '07/RANDOM '07 Proceedings of the 10th International Workshop on Approximation and the 11th International Workshop on Randomization, and Combinatorial Optimization. Algorithms and Techniques
Reducing mechanism design to algorithm design via machine learning
Journal of Computer and System Sciences
Stepwise randomized combinatorial auctions achieve revenue monotonicity
SODA '09 Proceedings of the twentieth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms
On the approximability of the maximum feasible subsystem problem with 0/1-coefficients
SODA '09 Proceedings of the twentieth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms
Selling ad campaigns: online algorithms with cancellations
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Truthful Mechanisms via Greedy Iterative Packing
APPROX '09 / RANDOM '09 Proceedings of the 12th International Workshop and 13th International Workshop on Approximation, Randomization, and Combinatorial Optimization. Algorithms and Techniques
Revenue monotonicity in combinatorial auctions
AAAI'07 Proceedings of the 22nd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
On Profit-Maximizing Pricing for the Highway and Tollbooth Problems
SAGT '09 Proceedings of the 2nd International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
A quasi-PTAS for profit-maximizing pricing on line graphs
ESA'07 Proceedings of the 15th annual European conference on Algorithms
Auctions with revenue guarantees for sponsored search
WINE'07 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Internet and network economics
Bayesian algorithmic mechanism design
Proceedings of the forty-second ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Approximation algorithms for non-single-minded profit-maximization problems with limited supply
WINE'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Internet and network economics
Prompt mechanism for ad placement over time
SAGT'11 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Algorithmic game theory
On the competitive ratio of the random sampling auction
WINE'05 Proceedings of the First international conference on Internet and Network Economics
The power of fair pricing mechanisms
LATIN'10 Proceedings of the 9th Latin American conference on Theoretical Informatics
Prior-free auctions with ordered bidders
STOC '12 Proceedings of the forty-fourth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Budget feasible mechanism design: from prior-free to bayesian
STOC '12 Proceedings of the forty-fourth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
A QPTAS for ε-envy-free profit-maximizing pricing on line graphs
ICALP'12 Proceedings of the 39th international colloquium conference on Automata, Languages, and Programming - Volume Part II
On the complexity of the highway problem
Theoretical Computer Science
Properties of symmetric incentive compatible auctions
COCOON'07 Proceedings of the 13th annual international conference on Computing and Combinatorics
Near-optimal multi-unit auctions with ordered bidders
Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce
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We consider a game theoretic knapsack problem that has application to auctions for selling advertisements on Internet search engines. Consider n agents each wishing to place an object in the knapsack. Each agent has a private valuation for having their object in the knapsack and each object has a publicly known size. For this setting, we consider the design of auctions in which agents have an incentive to truthfully reveal their private valuations. Following the framework of Goldberg et al. [10], we look to design an auction that obtains a constant fraction of the profit obtainable by a natural optimal pricing algorithm that knows the agents' valuations and object sizes.We give an auction that obtains a constant factor approximation in the non-trivial special case where the knapsack has unlimited capacity. We then reduce the limited capacity version of the problem to the unlimited capacity version via an approximately efficient auction (i.e., one that maximizes the social welfare). This reduction follows from generalizable principles.