Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
An approximate truthful mechanism for combinatorial auctions with single parameter agents
SODA '03 Proceedings of the fourteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Competitive queueing policies for QoS switches
SODA '03 Proceedings of the fourteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Incentive compatible multi unit combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the 9th conference on Theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge
Mechanism design for online real-time scheduling
EC '04 Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Approximation techniques for utilitarian mechanism design
Proceedings of the thirty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Online auctions with re-usable goods
Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Online ascending auctions for gradually expiring items
SODA '05 Proceedings of the sixteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Truthful and Near-Optimal Mechanism Design via Linear Programming
FOCS '05 Proceedings of the 46th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Tight approximation algorithms for maximum general assignment problems
SODA '06 Proceedings of the seventeenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithm
Single-value combinatorial auctions and implementation in undominated strategies
SODA '06 Proceedings of the seventeenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithm
SODA '06 Proceedings of the seventeenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithm
A Polynomial Time Approximation Scheme for the Multiple Knapsack Problem
SIAM Journal on Computing
Approximation algorithms for allocation problems: Improving the factor of 1 - 1/e
FOCS '06 Proceedings of the 47th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Truthful unsplittable flow for large capacity networks
Proceedings of the nineteenth annual ACM symposium on Parallel algorithms and architectures
Greedy in approximation algorithms
ESA'06 Proceedings of the 14th conference on Annual European Symposium - Volume 14
Better online buffer management
SODA '07 Proceedings of the eighteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Considering suppressed packets improves buffer management in QoS switches
SODA '07 Proceedings of the eighteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Algorithmic Game Theory
Optimal approximation for the submodular welfare problem in the value oracle model
STOC '08 Proceedings of the fortieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
On characterizations of truthful mechanisms for combinatorial auctions and scheduling
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Maximizing a Submodular Set Function Subject to a Matroid Constraint (Extended Abstract)
IPCO '07 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Integer Programming and Combinatorial Optimization
Truthful Unification Framework for Packing Integer Programs with Choices
ICALP '08 Proceedings of the 35th international colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming, Part I
Prompt Mechanisms for Online Auctions
SAGT '08 Proceedings of the 1st International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
Mechanism design for single-value domains
AAAI'05 Proceedings of the 20th national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Computationally feasible VCG mechanisms
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
On the limitations of Greedy mechanism design for truthful combinatorial auctions
ICALP'10 Proceedings of the 37th international colloquium conference on Automata, languages and programming
Prompt mechanism for ad placement over time
SAGT'11 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Algorithmic game theory
The loss of serving in the dark
Proceedings of the forty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
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An important research thread in algorithmic game theory studies the design of efficient truthful mechanisms that approximate the optimal social welfare. A fundamental question is whether an *** -approximation algorithm translates into an *** -approximate truthful mechanism. It is well-known that plugging an *** -approximation algorithm into the VCG technique may not yield a truthful mechanism. Thus, it is natural to investigate properties of approximation algorithms that enable their use in truthful mechanisms. The main contribution of this paper is to identify a useful and natural property of approximation algorithms, which we call loser-independence; this property is applicable in the single-minded and single-parameter settings. Intuitively, a loser-independent algorithm does not change its outcome when the bid of a losing agent increases, unless that agent becomes a winner. We demonstrate that loser-independent algorithms can be employed as sub-procedures in a greedy iterative packing approach while preserving monotonicity. A greedy iterative approach provides a good approximation in the context of maximizing a non-decreasing submodular function subject to independence constraints. Our framework gives rise to truthful approximation mechanisms for various problems. Notably, some problems arise in online mechanism design.