Rules of encounter: designing conventions for automated negotiation among computers
Rules of encounter: designing conventions for automated negotiation among computers
Algorithmic mechanism design (extended abstract)
STOC '99 Proceedings of the thirty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Sharing the cost of muliticast transmissions (preliminary version)
STOC '00 Proceedings of the thirty-second annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
iBundle: an efficient ascending price bundle auction
Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Bidding and allocation in combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Mechanism design with incomplete languages
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM conference on Electronic Commerce
SODA '02 Proceedings of the thirteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Incentive compatible multi unit combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the 9th conference on Theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge
Towards a Characterization of Truthful Combinatorial Auctions
FOCS '03 Proceedings of the 44th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
SODA '04 Proceedings of the fifteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Combinatorial Auctions
Distributed Algorithmic Mechanism Design for Scheduling on Unrelated Machines
ISPAN '05 Proceedings of the 8th International Symposium on Parallel Architectures,Algorithms and Networks
Linear degree extractors and the inapproximability of max clique and chromatic number
Proceedings of the thirty-eighth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
IJCAI'01 Proceedings of the 17th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 2
Mechanism design with execution uncertainty
UAI'02 Proceedings of the Eighteenth conference on Uncertainty in artificial intelligence
Of Mechanism Design Multiagent Planning
Proceedings of the 2008 conference on ECAI 2008: 18th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Truthful Mechanisms via Greedy Iterative Packing
APPROX '09 / RANDOM '09 Proceedings of the 12th International Workshop and 13th International Workshop on Approximation, Randomization, and Combinatorial Optimization. Algorithms and Techniques
A theory of expressiveness in mechanisms
AAAI'08 Proceedings of the 23rd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Creating Incentives to Prevent Intentional Execution Failures
WI-IAT '09 Proceedings of the 2009 IEEE/WIC/ACM International Joint Conference on Web Intelligence and Intelligent Agent Technology - Volume 02
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Collaboration and shared plans in the open world: studies of ridesharing
IJCAI'09 Proceedings of the 21st international jont conference on Artifical intelligence
Approximation Algorithms for Combinatorial Auctions with Complement-Free Bidders
Mathematics of Operations Research
Scalable mechanism design for the procurement of services with uncertain durations
Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems: volume 1 - Volume 1
Optimal temporal decoupling in multiagent systems
Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems: volume 1 - Volume 1
A multidimensional procurement auction for trading composite services
Electronic Commerce Research and Applications
Mechanisms for multi-unit auctions
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Inapproximability for VCG-based combinatorial auctions
SODA '10 Proceedings of the twenty-first annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
Auctions and bidding: A guide for computer scientists
ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR)
Comparing multiagent systems research in combinatorial auctions and voting
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
Average-case analysis of mechanism design with approximate resource allocation algorithms
WINE'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Internet and network economics
Average-case analysis of VCG with approximate resource allocation algorithms
Decision Support Systems
Simplicity-expressiveness tradeoffs in mechanism design
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Algorithms and mechanisms for procuring services with uncertain durations using redundancy
Artificial Intelligence
A combinatorial auction negotiation protocol for time-restricted group decisions
ICAIS'11 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Adaptive and intelligent systems
A trust-based game theoretical model for Web services collaboration
Knowledge-Based Systems
DDP: A Dynamic Dimensioning and Partitioning model of Virtual Private Networks resources
Computer Communications
Collusion-Resistant Mechanisms with Verification Yielding Optimal Solutions
ACM Transactions on Computation Theory (TOCT)
Combinatorial auctions with restricted complements
Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
Approximating optimal combinatorial auctions for complements using restricted welfare maximization
IJCAI'11 Proceedings of the Twenty-Second international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence - Volume Volume One
Mechanisms for multi-unit combinatorial auctions with a few distinct goods
Proceedings of the 2013 international conference on Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems
Computationally efficient techniques for economic mechanisms
Proceedings of the 2013 international conference on Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems
Decomposing combinatorial auctions and set packing problems
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Truthful optimization using mechanisms with verification
Theoretical Computer Science
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A major achievement of mechanism design theory is a general method for the construction of truthful mechanisms called VCG (Vickrey, Clarke, Groves). When applying this method to complex problems such as combinatorial auctions, a difficulty arises: VCG mechanisms are required to compute optimal outcomes and are, therefore, computationally infeasible. However, if the optimal outcome is replaced by the results of a sub-optimal algorithm, the resulting mechanism (termed VCG-based) is no longer necessarily truthful. The first part of this paper studies this phenomenon in depth and shows that it is near universal. Specifically, we prove that essentially all reasonable approximations or heuristics for combinatorial auctions as well as a wide class of cost minimization problems yield non-truthful VCG-based mechanisms. We generalize these results for affine maximizers. The second part of this paper proposes a general method for circumventing the above problem. We introduce a modification of VCG-based mechanisms in which the agents are given a chance to improve the output of the underlying algorithm. When the agents behave truthfully, the welfare obtained by the mechanism is at least as good as the one obtained by the algorithm's output. We provide a strong rationale for truth-telling behavior. Our method satisfies individual rationality as well.