Algorithmic mechanism design (extended abstract)
STOC '99 Proceedings of the thirty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Electronic commerce
iBundle: an efficient ascending price bundle auction
Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Approaches to winner determination in combinatorial auctions
Decision Support Systems - Special issue on information and computational economics
Bidding and allocation in combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Computationally feasible VCG mechanisms
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Taming the Computational Complexity of Combinatorial Auctions: Optimal and Approximate Approaches
IJCAI '99 Proceedings of the Sixteenth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Computationally Manageable Combinatorial Auctions
Computationally Manageable Combinatorial Auctions
Issues in computational Vickrey auctions
International Journal of Electronic Commerce - Special issue: Intelligent agents for electronic commerce
Price-Based Information Certificates for Minimal-Revelation Combinatorial Auctions
AAMAS '02 Revised Papers from the Workshop on Agent Mediated Electronic Commerce on Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce IV, Designing Mechanisms and Systems
Auction design with costly preference elicitation
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
Spectrum auction framework for access allocation in cognitive radio networks
Proceedings of the tenth ACM international symposium on Mobile ad hoc networking and computing
A theory of expressiveness in mechanisms
AAAI'08 Proceedings of the 23rd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Computationally feasible VCG mechanisms
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Spectrum auction framework for access allocation in cognitive radio networks
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
A major achievement of mechanism design theory is the family of truthful mechanisms often called VCG (named after Vickrey, Clarke and Groves). Although these mechanisms have many appealing properties, their essential intractability prevents them from being applied to complex problems like combinatorial auctions. In particular, VCG mechanisms require the agents to fully describe their valuation functions to the mechanism. Such a description may require exponential size and thus be infeasible for the agents.A natural approach for this problem is to introduce an intermediate language for the description of the valuations. Such a language must be succinct to both the agents and the mechanism. Unfortunately, the resulting mechanisms are neither truthful nor do they satisfy individual rationality.This paper suggests a general method for overcoming this difficulty. Given an intermediate language and an algorithm for computing the results, we propose three different mechanisms, each more powerful than its predecessor, but also more time consuming. Under reasonable assumptions, the results of our mechanisms are at least as good as the results of the algorithm on the actual valuations. All of our mechanisms have polynomial computational time and satisfy individual rationality.