Computationally Manageable Combinational Auctions
Management Science
Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Electronic commerce
iBundle: an efficient ascending price bundle auction
Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Bidding and allocation in combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM conference on Electronic commerce
AkBA: a progressive, anonymous-price combinatorial auction
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Computationally feasible VCG mechanisms
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Mechanism design with incomplete languages
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM conference on Electronic Commerce
Preference elicitation in combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM conference on Electronic Commerce
Iterative Combinatorial Auctions: Theory and Practice
Proceedings of the Seventeenth National Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Twelfth Conference on Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence
Preventing Strategic Manipulation in Iterative Auctions: Proxy Agents and Price-Adjustment
Proceedings of the Seventeenth National Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Twelfth Conference on Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence
Effectiveness of Preference Elicitation in Combinatorial Auctions
AAMAS '02 Revised Papers from the Workshop on Agent Mediated Electronic Commerce on Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce IV, Designing Mechanisms and Systems
Differential -Revelation VCG Mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions
AAMAS '02 Revised Papers from the Workshop on Agent Mediated Electronic Commerce on Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce IV, Designing Mechanisms and Systems
Partial-revelation VCG mechanism for combinatorial auctions
Eighteenth national conference on Artificial intelligence
Iterative combinatorial auctions: achieving economic and computational efficiency
Iterative combinatorial auctions: achieving economic and computational efficiency
Combinatorial Auctions: A Survey
INFORMS Journal on Computing
CABOB: a fast optimal algorithm for combinatorial auctions
IJCAI'01 Proceedings of the 17th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 2
Bidding languages for combinatorial auctions
IJCAI'01 Proceedings of the 17th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 2
A Software Infrastructure for Negotiation within Inter-organisational Alliances
AAMAS '02 Revised Papers from the Workshop on Agent Mediated Electronic Commerce on Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce IV, Designing Mechanisms and Systems
An English Auction Protocol for Multi-attribute Items
AAMAS '02 Revised Papers from the Workshop on Agent Mediated Electronic Commerce on Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce IV, Designing Mechanisms and Systems
Differential-revelation VCG mechanisms for combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Preference elicitation in proxied multiattribute auctions
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Applying learning algorithms to preference elicitation
EC '04 Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Auction design with costly preference elicitation
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
Contract-based load management in federated distributed systems
NSDI'04 Proceedings of the 1st conference on Symposium on Networked Systems Design and Implementation - Volume 1
On the communication requirements of verifying the VCG outcome
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
IJCAI'05 Proceedings of the 19th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence
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The equilibrium of the direct-revelation Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism for combinatorial auctions requires every agent to provide complete information about its preferences. Not only is this unreasonable in settings with costly preference evaluation, but moreover it is often possible to implement the same outcome with incomplete preference information. We formalize the problem of minimal-revelation mechanism design and introduce the concept of minimal information certificates. Linear programming duality theory proves that a class of price-based information certificates are both necessary and sufficient to compute an efficient allocation in a dominant strategy mechanism.