Computationally Manageable Combinational Auctions
Management Science
eMediator: a next generation electronic commerce server
AGENTS '00 Proceedings of the fourth international conference on Autonomous agents
Bidding and allocation in combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM conference on Electronic commerce
AkBA: a progressive, anonymous-price combinatorial auction
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Preference elicitation in combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM conference on Electronic Commerce
Algorithm for optimal winner determination in combinatorial auctions
Artificial Intelligence
Improved Algorithms for Optimal Winner Determination in Combinatorial Auctions and Generalizations
Proceedings of the Seventeenth National Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Twelfth Conference on Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence
Iterative Combinatorial Auctions: Theory and Practice
Proceedings of the Seventeenth National Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Twelfth Conference on Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence
Preventing Strategic Manipulation in Iterative Auctions: Proxy Agents and Price-Adjustment
Proceedings of the Seventeenth National Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Twelfth Conference on Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence
Effectiveness of Preference Elicitation in Combinatorial Auctions
AAMAS '02 Revised Papers from the Workshop on Agent Mediated Electronic Commerce on Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce IV, Designing Mechanisms and Systems
Partial-revelation VCG mechanism for combinatorial auctions
Eighteenth national conference on Artificial intelligence
Integer Programming for Combinatorial Auction Winner Determination
ICMAS '00 Proceedings of the Fourth International Conference on MultiAgent Systems (ICMAS-2000)
Costly valuation computation in auctions
TARK '01 Proceedings of the 8th conference on Theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge
Issues in computational Vickrey auctions
International Journal of Electronic Commerce - Special issue: Intelligent agents for electronic commerce
Taming the computational complexity of combinatorial auctions: optimal and approximate approaches
IJCAI'99 Proceedings of the 16th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence - Volume 1
CABOB: a fast optimal algorithm for combinatorial auctions
IJCAI'01 Proceedings of the 17th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 2
Bidding languages for combinatorial auctions
IJCAI'01 Proceedings of the 17th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 2
Preference elicitation in combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the first international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems: part 1
Price-Based Information Certificates for Minimal-Revelation Combinatorial Auctions
AAMAS '02 Revised Papers from the Workshop on Agent Mediated Electronic Commerce on Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce IV, Designing Mechanisms and Systems
A Software Infrastructure for Negotiation within Inter-organisational Alliances
AAMAS '02 Revised Papers from the Workshop on Agent Mediated Electronic Commerce on Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce IV, Designing Mechanisms and Systems
An English Auction Protocol for Multi-attribute Items
AAMAS '02 Revised Papers from the Workshop on Agent Mediated Electronic Commerce on Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce IV, Designing Mechanisms and Systems
On polynomial-time preference elicitation with value queries
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Differential-revelation VCG mechanisms for combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Using value queries in combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Preference Elicitation and Query Learning
The Journal of Machine Learning Research
Making markets and democracy work: a story of incentives and computing
IJCAI'03 Proceedings of the 18th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence
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Combinatorial auctions, where bidders can submit bids on bundles of items, are economically efficient mechanisms for selling items to bidders, and are attractive when the bidders' valuations on bundles exhibit complementarity and/or substitutability. Determining the winners in such auctions is a complex optimization problem that has received considerable research attention during the last 4 years. An equally important problem, which has only recently started to receive attention, is that of eliciting the bidders' preferences so that they do not have to bid on all combinations [6,8]. Preference elicitation has been shown to be remarkably effective in reducing revelation [13]. In this paper we introduce a new family of preference elicitation algorithms. The algorithms in this family do not rely on absolute bids, but rather on relative (differential) value information. This holds the promise to reduce the revelation of the bidders' valuations even further. We develop a differential-elicitation algorithm that finds the efficient allocation of items to the bidders, and as a side-effect, the Vickrey payments (which make truthful bidding incentive compatible). We also present two auction mechanisms that use differential elicitation: the difference mechanism and the difference increment mechanism.