iBundle: an efficient ascending price bundle auction
Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Preference elicitation in combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM conference on Electronic Commerce
Effectiveness of Preference Elicitation in Combinatorial Auctions
AAMAS '02 Revised Papers from the Workshop on Agent Mediated Electronic Commerce on Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce IV, Designing Mechanisms and Systems
Differential -Revelation VCG Mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions
AAMAS '02 Revised Papers from the Workshop on Agent Mediated Electronic Commerce on Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce IV, Designing Mechanisms and Systems
On polynomial-time preference elicitation with value queries
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Applying learning algorithms to preference elicitation
EC '04 Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Making markets and democracy work: a story of incentives and computing
IJCAI'03 Proceedings of the 18th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence
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Combinatorial auctions, where bidders can bid on bundles of items, are known to be desirable auction mechanisms for selling items that are complementary and/or substitutable. However, there are 2k --1 bundles, and each agent may need to bid on all of them to fully express its preferences. We address this by showing how them auctioneer can recommend to the agents incrementally which bundles to bid on so that they need to only place a small fraction of all possible bids. These algorithms impose a great computational burden on the auctioneer; we show how to speed them up dramatically. We also present an optimal elicitor, which is intractable but may be the basis for future algorithms. Finally, we introduce the notion of a universal revelation reducer, demonstrate a randomized one, and prove that no deterministic one exists.The full paper is available in draft form at http://www.cs.cmu.edu/ sandholm/using_value_queries.pdf.