Algorithms, games, and the internet
STOC '01 Proceedings of the thirty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Truthful Mechanisms for One-Parameter Agents
FOCS '01 Proceedings of the 42nd IEEE symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
SODA '04 Proceedings of the fifteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Approximation techniques for utilitarian mechanism design
Proceedings of the thirty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Collusion-resistant mechanisms for single-parameter agents
SODA '05 Proceedings of the sixteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
A truthful mechanism for the non-utilitarian minimum radius spanning tree problem
Proceedings of the seventeenth annual ACM symposium on Parallelism in algorithms and architectures
Truthful mechanism design for multi-dimensional scheduling via cycle monotonicity
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Setting lower bounds on truthfulness: extended abstract
SODA '07 Proceedings of the eighteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
A lower bound for scheduling mechanisms
SODA '07 Proceedings of the eighteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
STOC '08 Proceedings of the fortieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
The power of verification for one-parameter agents
Journal of Computer and System Sciences
Optimal collusion-resistant mechanisms with verification
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Computationally feasible VCG mechanisms
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
STACS'99 Proceedings of the 16th annual conference on Theoretical aspects of computer science
Improved lower bounds for non-utilitarian truthfulness
WAOA'07 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Approximation and online algorithms
Mechanisms with verification for any finite domain
WINE'06 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Internet and Network Economics
New constructions of mechanisms with verification
ICALP'06 Proceedings of the 33rd international conference on Automata, Languages and Programming - Volume Part I
Truthful approximation mechanisms for scheduling selfish related machines
STACS'05 Proceedings of the 22nd annual conference on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science
A lower bound of 1 + ϕ for truthful scheduling mechanisms
MFCS'07 Proceedings of the 32nd international conference on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science
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A truthful mechanism consists of an algorithm augmented with a suitable payment function that guarantees that the players cannot improve their utilities by cheating. Mechanism design approaches are particularly appealing for designing protocols that cannot be manipulated by rational players. We present new constructions of so-called mechanisms with verification introduced by Nisan and Ronen [2001]. We first show how to obtain mechanisms that, for single-parameter domains, are resistant to coalitions of colluding agents even if they can exchange compensations. Based on this result we derive a class of exact truthful mechanisms with verification for arbitrary bounded domains. This class of problems includes most of the problems studied in the algorithmic mechanism design literature and for which exact solutions cannot be obtained with truthful mechanisms without verification. This result is an improvement over all known previous constructions of exact mechanisms with verification.