Using dual approximation algorithms for scheduling problems theoretical and practical results
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Algorithmic mechanism design (extended abstract)
STOC '99 Proceedings of the thirty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Algorithms, games, and the internet
STOC '01 Proceedings of the thirty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Approximation algorithms
Truthful Mechanisms for One-Parameter Agents
FOCS '01 Proceedings of the 42nd IEEE symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Setting lower bounds on truthfulness: extended abstract
SODA '07 Proceedings of the eighteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Routing selfish unsplittable traffic
ACM Transactions on Algorithms (TALG)
STACS'99 Proceedings of the 16th annual conference on Theoretical aspects of computer science
Fast monotone 3-approximation algorithm for scheduling related machines
ESA'05 Proceedings of the 13th annual European conference on Algorithms
Truthful approximation mechanisms for scheduling selfish related machines
STACS'05 Proceedings of the 22nd annual conference on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science
Optimal collusion-resistant mechanisms with verification
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Collusion-Resistant Mechanisms with Verification Yielding Optimal Solutions
ACM Transactions on Computation Theory (TOCT)
Mechanism design: from partial to probabilistic verification
Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
Funding games: the truth but not the whole truth
WINE'12 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Truthful optimization using mechanisms with verification
Theoretical Computer Science
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We initiate the study of mechanisms with verification for one-parameter agents. We give an algorithmic characterization of such mechanisms and show that they are provably better than mechanisms without verification, i.e., those previously considered in the literature. These results are obtained for a number of optimization problems motivated by the Internet and recently studied in the algorithmic mechanism design literature. The characterization can be regarded as an alternative approach to existing techniques to design truthful mechanisms. The construction of such mechanisms reduces to the construction of an algorithm satisfying certain ''monotonicity'' conditions which, for the case of verification, are much less stringent. In other words, verification makes the construction easier and the algorithm more efficient (both computationally and in terms of approximability).