Truthful Mechanisms for One-Parameter Agents
FOCS '01 Proceedings of the 42nd IEEE symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
SODA '04 Proceedings of the fifteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Collusion-resistant mechanisms for single-parameter agents
SODA '05 Proceedings of the sixteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Beyond VCG: Frugality of Truthful Mechanisms
FOCS '05 Proceedings of the 46th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Asymptotically optimal repeated auctions for sponsored search
Proceedings of the ninth international conference on Electronic commerce
Setting lower bounds on truthfulness: extended abstract
SODA '07 Proceedings of the eighteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Multi-bidding Strategy in Sponsored Keyword Auction
FAW '08 Proceedings of the 2nd annual international workshop on Frontiers in Algorithmics
Collusion-Resistant Mechanisms with Verification Yielding Optimal Solutions
ESA '08 Proceedings of the 16th annual European symposium on Algorithms
The power of verification for one-parameter agents
Journal of Computer and System Sciences
Fast payment schemes for truthful mechanisms with verification
Theoretical Computer Science
Optimal collusion-resistant mechanisms with verification
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Computationally feasible VCG mechanisms
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Improved lower bounds for non-utilitarian truthfulness
WAOA'07 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Approximation and online algorithms
Inapproximability for VCG-based combinatorial auctions
SODA '10 Proceedings of the twenty-first annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
Combinatorial auctions with verification are tractable
ESA'10 Proceedings of the 18th annual European conference on Algorithms: Part II
Mechanisms with verification for any finite domain
WINE'06 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Internet and Network Economics
On the existence of truthful mechanisms for the minimum-cost approximate shortest-paths tree problem
SIROCCO'06 Proceedings of the 13th international conference on Structural Information and Communication Complexity
New constructions of mechanisms with verification
ICALP'06 Proceedings of the 33rd international conference on Automata, Languages and Programming - Volume Part I
A lower bound of 1 + ϕ for truthful scheduling mechanisms
MFCS'07 Proceedings of the 32nd international conference on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science
Mechanism design for fractional scheduling on unrelated machines
ICALP'07 Proceedings of the 34th international conference on Automata, Languages and Programming
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We study the question of whether optimization problems can be solved exactly in the presence of economic constraints, such as truthfulness of selfish agents. In general, imposing these extra constraints makes it impossible to optimize, even in exponential time. To reconcile optimization and economic incentives we focus on so-called mechanisms with verification and show that, under this general mechanism design paradigm, it is indeed possible to optimize and to be truthful. Our truthful mechanisms minimize any cost function that is monotone nondecreasing in agents@? costs under the technical hypothesis that the possible declarations of the selfish agents belong to a finite set. Our results also extend to the multidimensional scenario of compound agents; in the case in which the single dimensions are one-parameter, we also show how to implement truthfully and efficiently classical (approximation) algorithms for cost functions that behave smoothly in the presence of input rounding. Our results are applied to a number of very general scheduling problems to obtain the first truthful mechanisms for them. Finally, the issue of designing mechanisms with verification for infinite domains is studied showing the limitations that the imposition of the Taxation Principle yields.