Computationally feasible VCG mechanisms
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Algorithms, games, and the internet
STOC '01 Proceedings of the thirty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Truthful Mechanisms for One-Parameter Agents
FOCS '01 Proceedings of the 42nd IEEE symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
SODA '04 Proceedings of the fifteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Collusion-resistant mechanisms for single-parameter agents
SODA '05 Proceedings of the sixteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
A truthful mechanism for the non-utilitarian minimum radius spanning tree problem
Proceedings of the seventeenth annual ACM symposium on Parallelism in algorithms and architectures
A BGP-based mechanism for lowest-cost routing
Distributed Computing - Special issue: PODC 02
Setting lower bounds on truthfulness: extended abstract
SODA '07 Proceedings of the eighteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
A lower bound for scheduling mechanisms
SODA '07 Proceedings of the eighteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Improved lower bounds for non-utilitarian truthfulness
WAOA'07 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Approximation and online algorithms
Mechanisms with verification for any finite domain
WINE'06 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Internet and Network Economics
New constructions of mechanisms with verification
ICALP'06 Proceedings of the 33rd international conference on Automata, Languages and Programming - Volume Part I
A lower bound of 1 + ϕ for truthful scheduling mechanisms
MFCS'07 Proceedings of the 32nd international conference on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science
Combinatorial auctions with verification are tractable
ESA'10 Proceedings of the 18th annual European conference on Algorithms: Part II
Mechanism design: from partial to probabilistic verification
Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
Funding games: the truth but not the whole truth
WINE'12 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Truthful optimization using mechanisms with verification
Theoretical Computer Science
Theory of Computing Systems
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
A truthful mechanismconsists of an algorithm augmented with a suitable payment function which guarantees that "players" cannot improve their utilities by "cheating". Mechanism design approaches are particularly appealing for designing "protocols" that cannot be manipulated by rational players.We present new constructions of so called mechanisms with verificationintroduced by Nisan and Ronen [STOC 1999]. We first show how to obtain mechanisms that, for single-parameter domains, are resistant to coalitionsof colluding agents even in the case in which compensation among members of the coalition is allowed (i.e., n-truthfulmechanisms). Based on this technique we derive a class of exacttruthful mechanisms with verification for arbitrarybounded domains. This class of problems includes most of the problems studied in the algorithmic mechanism design literature and for which exact solutions cannot be obtained with truthful mechanisms without verification. This result improves over all known previous constructions of exact mechanisms with verification.