Computationally feasible VCG mechanisms
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
An approximate truthful mechanism for combinatorial auctions with single parameter agents
SODA '03 Proceedings of the fourteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
The Communication Complexity of Approximate Set Packing and Covering
ICALP '02 Proceedings of the 29th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming
Incentive compatible multi unit combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the 9th conference on Theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge
Approximation techniques for utilitarian mechanism design
Proceedings of the thirty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
On the complexity of approximating k-set packing
Computational Complexity
Algorithmic Game Theory
Multi-bidding Strategy in Sponsored Keyword Auction
FAW '08 Proceedings of the 2nd annual international workshop on Frontiers in Algorithmics
Collusion-Resistant Mechanisms with Verification Yielding Optimal Solutions
ESA '08 Proceedings of the 16th annual European symposium on Algorithms
Two Randomized Mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions
APPROX '07/RANDOM '07 Proceedings of the 10th International Workshop on Approximation and the 11th International Workshop on Randomization, and Combinatorial Optimization. Algorithms and Techniques
Optimal collusion-resistant mechanisms with verification
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Inapproximability for VCG-based combinatorial auctions
SODA '10 Proceedings of the twenty-first annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
On the Computational Power of Demand Queries
SIAM Journal on Computing
Mechanisms with verification for any finite domain
WINE'06 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Greedy approximation via duality for packing, combinatorial auctions and routing
MFCS'05 Proceedings of the 30th international conference on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science
Extending characterizations of truthful mechanisms from subdomains to domains
WINE'11 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Mechanism design: from partial to probabilistic verification
Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
Winner-imposing strategyproof mechanisms for multiple Facility Location games
Theoretical Computer Science
Truthful optimization using mechanisms with verification
Theoretical Computer Science
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
We study mechanism design for social welfare maximization in combinatorial auctions with general bidders given by demand oracles. It is a major open problem in this setting to design a deterministic truthful auction which would provide the best possible approximation guarantee in polynomial time, even if bidders are double-minded (i.e., they assign positive value to only two sets in their demand collection). On the other hand, there are known such randomized truthful auctions in this setting. In the general model of verification (i.e., some kind of overbidding can be detected) we design the first deterministic truthful auctions which indeed provide essentially the best possible approximation guarantees achievable by any polynomial-time algorithm. This shows that deterministic truthful auctions have the same power as randomized ones if the bidders withdraw from unrealistic lies.