Algorithmic mechanism design (extended abstract)
STOC '99 Proceedings of the thirty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Towards a Characterization of Truthful Combinatorial Auctions
FOCS '03 Proceedings of the 44th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Approximation algorithms for combinatorial auctions with complement-free bidders
Proceedings of the thirty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Limitations of VCG-based mechanisms
Proceedings of the thirty-ninth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Algorithmic Game Theory
Searching for the possibility: impossibility border of truthful mechanism design
ACM SIGecom Exchanges
On characterizations of truthful mechanisms for combinatorial auctions and scheduling
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
A Characterization of 2-Player Mechanisms for Scheduling
ESA '08 Proceedings of the 16th annual European symposium on Algorithms
On the Hardness of Being Truthful
FOCS '08 Proceedings of the 2008 49th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
A Modular Approach to Roberts' Theorem
SAGT '09 Proceedings of the 2nd International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
WINE '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Inapproximability for VCG-based combinatorial auctions
SODA '10 Proceedings of the twenty-first annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
Combinatorial auctions with verification are tractable
ESA'10 Proceedings of the 18th annual European conference on Algorithms: Part II
An impossibility result for truthful combinatorial auctions with submodular valuations
Proceedings of the forty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
A lower bound of 1 + ϕ for truthful scheduling mechanisms
MFCS'07 Proceedings of the 32nd international conference on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science
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The already extended literature in Combinatorial Auctions, Public Projects and Scheduling demands a more systematic classification of the domains and a clear comparison of the results known. Connecting characterization results for different settings and providing a characterization proof using another characterization result as a black box without having to repeat a tediously similar proof is not only elegant and desirable, but also greatly enhances our intuition and provides a classification of different results and a unified and deeper understanding. We consider whether one can extend a characterization of a subdomain to a domain in a black-box manner. We show that this is possible for n-player stable mechanisms if the only truthful mechanisms for the subdomain are the affine maximizers. We further show that if the characterization of the subdomain involves a combination of affine maximizers and threshold mechanisms, the threshold mechanisms for the subdomain cannot be extended to truthful mechanisms for the union of the subdomain with a (very slight) affine transformation of it. We also show that for every truthful mechanism in a domain there exists a corresponding truthful mechanism for any affine transformation of the domain. We finally plug in as a black box to our theorems the characterization of additive 2-player combinatorial auctions that are decisive and allocate all items (which essentially is the domain for scheduling unrelated machines) and show that the 2-player truthful mechanisms of any domain, which is strictly a superdomain of it are only the affine maximizers. This gives a unique characterization proof of the decisive 2-player mechanisms for: Combinatorial Public Projects, Unrestricted domains, as well as for Submodular and Subadditive Combinatorial Auctions that allocate all items.