Communication complexity
Polynomial time approximation schemes for Euclidean traveling salesman and other geometric problems
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Algorithmic mechanism design (extended abstract)
STOC '99 Proceedings of the thirty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Computationally feasible VCG mechanisms
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Approximation algorithms
Combinatorial auctions with decreasing marginal utilities
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM conference on Electronic Commerce
Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
An approximate truthful mechanism for combinatorial auctions with single parameter agents
SODA '03 Proceedings of the fourteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
The Communication Complexity of Approximate Set Packing and Covering
ICALP '02 Proceedings of the 29th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming
Truthful approximation mechanisms for restricted combinatorial auctions: extended abstract
Eighteenth national conference on Artificial intelligence
Incentive compatible multi unit combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the 9th conference on Theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge
Approximation algorithms for combinatorial auctions with complement-free bidders
Proceedings of the thirty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Truthful and Near-Optimal Mechanism Design via Linear Programming
FOCS '05 Proceedings of the 46th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
An improved approximation algorithm for combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders
SODA '06 Proceedings of the seventeenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithm
On maximizing welfare when utility functions are subadditive
Proceedings of the thirty-eighth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Truthful randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the thirty-eighth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Welfare maximization in congestion games
EC '06 Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Approximation algorithms for allocation problems: Improving the factor of 1 - 1/e
FOCS '06 Proceedings of the 47th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Mechanisms for multi-unit auctions
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Inapproximability results for combinatorial auctions with submodular utility functions
WINE'05 Proceedings of the First international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Mechanisms for multi-unit auctions
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Better mechanisms for combinatorial auctions via maximal-in-range algorithms?
ACM SIGecom Exchanges
On characterizations of truthful mechanisms for combinatorial auctions and scheduling
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Two Randomized Mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions
APPROX '07/RANDOM '07 Proceedings of the 10th International Workshop on Approximation and the 11th International Workshop on Randomization, and Combinatorial Optimization. Algorithms and Techniques
Single-value combinatorial auctions and algorithmic implementation in undominated strategies
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Inapproximability of Combinatorial Public Projects
WINE '08 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
A Modular Approach to Roberts' Theorem
SAGT '09 Proceedings of the 2nd International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
Approximation Algorithms for Combinatorial Auctions with Complement-Free Bidders
Mathematics of Operations Research
ACM SIGACT News
Mechanisms for multi-unit auctions
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Inapproximability for VCG-based combinatorial auctions
SODA '10 Proceedings of the twenty-first annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
Algorithms and theory of computation handbook
Comparing multiagent systems research in combinatorial auctions and voting
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
Single-parameter combinatorial auctions with partially public valuations
SAGT'10 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Algorithmic game theory
Multi-unit auctions: beyond roberts
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
A truthful randomized mechanism for combinatorial public projects via convex optimization
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
An impossibility result for truthful combinatorial auctions with submodular valuations
Proceedings of the forty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Extending characterizations of truthful mechanisms from subdomains to domains
WINE'11 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
From query complexity to computational complexity
STOC '12 Proceedings of the forty-fourth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
The computational complexity of truthfulness in combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
We consider computationally-efficient incentive-compatiblemechanisms that use the VCG payment scheme, and study how well theycan approximate the social welfare in auction settings. We present anovel technique for setting lower bounds on the approximation ratioof this type of mechanisms. Specifically, for combinatorial auctionsamong submodular (and thus also subadditive) bidders we prove an Ω(m1/6) lower bound, which is close to the knownupper bound of O(m1/2), and qualitatively higher than theconstant factor approximation possible from a purely computationalpoint of view.