Computationally feasible VCG mechanisms
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Truthful approximation mechanisms for restricted combinatorial auctions: extended abstract
Eighteenth national conference on Artificial intelligence
Towards a Characterization of Truthful Combinatorial Auctions
FOCS '03 Proceedings of the 44th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Approximation techniques for utilitarian mechanism design
Proceedings of the thirty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Approximately-strategyproof and tractable multiunit auctions
Decision Support Systems - Special issue: The fourth ACM conference on electronic commerce
Truthful and Near-Optimal Mechanism Design via Linear Programming
FOCS '05 Proceedings of the 46th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Limitations of VCG-based mechanisms
Proceedings of the thirty-ninth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Limitations of VCG-based mechanisms
Proceedings of the thirty-ninth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Searching for the possibility: impossibility border of truthful mechanism design
ACM SIGecom Exchanges
Better mechanisms for combinatorial auctions via maximal-in-range algorithms?
ACM SIGecom Exchanges
On characterizations of truthful mechanisms for combinatorial auctions and scheduling
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Item pricing for revenue maximization
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Item pricing for revenue maximization
ACM SIGecom Exchanges
Worst-case efficiency ratio in false-name-proof combinatorial auction mechanisms
Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems: volume 1 - Volume 1
Price of anarchy for greedy auctions
SODA '10 Proceedings of the twenty-first annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
Utilitarian mechanism design for multi-objective optimization
SODA '10 Proceedings of the twenty-first annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
Algorithms and theory of computation handbook
Approximation schemes for sequential posted pricing in multi-unit auctions
WINE'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Internet and network economics
Multi-unit auctions: beyond roberts
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Truthful and Near-Optimal Mechanism Design via Linear Programming
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
A universally-truthful approximation scheme for multi-unit auctions
Proceedings of the twenty-third annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
Approximation Techniques for Utilitarian Mechanism Design
SIAM Journal on Computing
Randomized mechanisms for multi-unit auctions
ICALP'12 Proceedings of the 39th international colloquium conference on Automata, Languages, and Programming - Volume Part II
Funding games: the truth but not the whole truth
WINE'12 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Mechanisms for multi-unit combinatorial auctions with a few distinct goods
Proceedings of the 2013 international conference on Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems
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We present an incentive-compatible polynomial-time approximation scheme for multi-unit auctions with general k-minded playervaluations. The mechanism fully optimizes over an appropriately chosen sub-range of possible allocations and then uses VCG payments over this sub-range. We show that obtaining a fully polynomial-time incentive-compatible approximation scheme, at least using VCG payments, is NP-hard. For the case of valuations given by black boxes, we give a polynomial-time incentive-compatible 2-approximation mechanism and show that no better is possible, at least using VCG payments.