Some optimal inapproximability results
STOC '97 Proceedings of the twenty-ninth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Algorithmic mechanism design (extended abstract)
STOC '99 Proceedings of the thirty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions
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Optimal solutions for multi-unit combinatorial auctions: branch and bound heuristics
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Algorithms, games, and the internet
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Combinatorial auctions with decreasing marginal utilities
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Journal of the ACM (JACM)
(Incremental) priority algorithms
SODA '02 Proceedings of the thirteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Incentive compatible multi unit combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the 9th conference on Theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge
Truthful Mechanisms for One-Parameter Agents
FOCS '01 Proceedings of the 42nd IEEE symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Approximation techniques for utilitarian mechanism design
Proceedings of the thirty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
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Truthful and Near-Optimal Mechanism Design via Linear Programming
FOCS '05 Proceedings of the 46th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Truthful randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions
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Games with Incomplete Information Played by "Bayesian" Players, I-III
Management Science
Mechanisms for multi-unit auctions
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Greedy in approximation algorithms
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Algorithmic Game Theory
Bayesian Combinatorial Auctions
ICALP '08 Proceedings of the 35th international colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming, Part I
On the Hardness of Being Truthful
FOCS '08 Proceedings of the 2008 49th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Bayesian algorithmic mechanism design
Proceedings of the forty-second ACM symposium on Theory of computing
On the limitations of Greedy mechanism design for truthful combinatorial auctions
ICALP'10 Proceedings of the 37th international colloquium conference on Automata, languages and programming
GSP auctions with correlated types
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
On the efficiency of equilibria in generalized second price auctions
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Welfare guarantees for combinatorial auctions with item bidding
Proceedings of the twenty-second annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
The price of anarchy in games of incomplete information
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Uniform price auctions: equilibria and efficiency
SAGT'12 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Algorithmic Game Theory
Simultaneous single-item auctions
WINE'12 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Risk sensitivity of price of anarchy under uncertainty
Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Simultaneous auctions are (almost) efficient
Proceedings of the forty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Composable and efficient mechanisms
Proceedings of the forty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
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We study mechanisms for utilitarian combinatorial allocation problems, where agents are not assumed to be single-minded. This class of problems includes combinatorial auctions, multi-unit auctions, unsplittable flow problems, and others. We focus on the problem of designing mechanisms that approximately optimize social welfare at every Bayes-Nash equilibrium (BNE), which is the standard notion of equilibrium in settings of incomplete information. For a broad class of greedy approximation algorithms, we give a general black-box reduction to deterministic mechanisms with almost no loss to the approximation ratio at any BNE. We also consider the special case of Nash equilibria in full-information games, where we obtain tightened results. This solution concept is closely related to the well-studied price of anarchy. Furthermore, for a rich subclass of allocation problems, pure Nash equilibria are guaranteed to exist for our mechanisms. For many problems, the approximation factors we obtain at equilibrium improve upon the best known results for deterministic truthful mechanisms. In particular, we exhibit a simple deterministic mechanism for general combinatorial auctions that obtains an O(√m) approximation at every BNE.