Algorithmic mechanism design (extended abstract)
STOC '99 Proceedings of the thirty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Computationally feasible VCG mechanisms
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Combinatorial auctions with decreasing marginal utilities
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM conference on Electronic Commerce
Algorithm for optimal winner determination in combinatorial auctions
Artificial Intelligence
Competitive generalized auctions
STOC '02 Proceedings of the thiry-fourth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
An approximate truthful mechanism for combinatorial auctions with single parameter agents
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FOCS '03 Proceedings of the 44th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Approximation algorithms for combinatorial auctions with complement-free bidders
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On the computational power of iterative auctions
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Combinatorial Auctions
Truthful and Near-Optimal Mechanism Design via Linear Programming
FOCS '05 Proceedings of the 46th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
An improved approximation algorithm for combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders
SODA '06 Proceedings of the seventeenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithm
On maximizing welfare when utility functions are subadditive
Proceedings of the thirty-eighth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Inapproximability results for combinatorial auctions with submodular utility functions
WINE'05 Proceedings of the First international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Welfare maximization in congestion games
EC '06 Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Limitations of VCG-based mechanisms
Proceedings of the thirty-ninth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Stochastic packing-market planning
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SODA '07 Proceedings of the eighteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
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Searching for the possibility: impossibility border of truthful mechanism design
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Better mechanisms for combinatorial auctions via maximal-in-range algorithms?
ACM SIGecom Exchanges
Incentive compatible regression learning
Proceedings of the nineteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
A combinatorial allocation mechanism with penalties for banner advertising
Proceedings of the 17th international conference on World Wide Web
On characterizations of truthful mechanisms for combinatorial auctions and scheduling
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Item pricing for revenue maximization
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
A Characterization of 2-Player Mechanisms for Scheduling
ESA '08 Proceedings of the 16th annual European symposium on Algorithms
Two Randomized Mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions
APPROX '07/RANDOM '07 Proceedings of the 10th International Workshop on Approximation and the 11th International Workshop on Randomization, and Combinatorial Optimization. Algorithms and Techniques
Single-value combinatorial auctions and algorithmic implementation in undominated strategies
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Item pricing for revenue maximization
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Stepwise randomized combinatorial auctions achieve revenue monotonicity
SODA '09 Proceedings of the twentieth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms
Truthful mechanisms for two-range-values variant of unrelated scheduling
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Approximate mechanism design without money
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
The Balloon Popping Problem Revisited: Lower and Upper Bounds
SAGT '09 Proceedings of the 2nd International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
Mechanism design for fractional scheduling on unrelated machines
ACM Transactions on Algorithms (TALG)
Approximation Algorithms for Combinatorial Auctions with Complement-Free Bidders
Mathematics of Operations Research
Characterizing truthful market design
WINE'07 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Internet and network economics
Improved lower bounds for non-utilitarian truthfulness
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Incentive compatible regression learning
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Inapproximability for VCG-based combinatorial auctions
SODA '10 Proceedings of the twenty-first annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
Price of anarchy for greedy auctions
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Pricing randomized allocations
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Comparing multiagent systems research in combinatorial auctions and voting
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Improved lower bounds for non-utilitarian truthfulness
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Approximation schemes for sequential posted pricing in multi-unit auctions
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Average-case analysis of mechanism design with approximate resource allocation algorithms
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On the Computational Power of Demand Queries
SIAM Journal on Computing
Average-case analysis of VCG with approximate resource allocation algorithms
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Approximation algorithms for secondary spectrum auctions
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Multi-unit auctions: beyond roberts
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A truthful randomized mechanism for combinatorial public projects via convex optimization
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An impossibility result for truthful combinatorial auctions with submodular valuations
Proceedings of the forty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Mechanism design with uncertain inputs: (to err is human, to forgive divine)
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Sum of us: strategyproof selection from the selectors
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Truthful auctions with optimal profit
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A universally-truthful approximation scheme for multi-unit auctions
Proceedings of the twenty-third annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
Submodular functions are noise stable
Proceedings of the twenty-third annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
Bayesian incentive compatibility via fractional assignments
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Optimization with demand oracles
Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
Approximation Techniques for Utilitarian Mechanism Design
SIAM Journal on Computing
Online mechanism design (randomized rounding on the fly)
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A lower bound of 1 + ϕ for truthful scheduling mechanisms
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Mechanism design for fractional scheduling on unrelated machines
ICALP'07 Proceedings of the 34th international conference on Automata, Languages and Programming
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Multi-parameter mechanisms with implicit payment computation
Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Combinatorial walrasian equilibrium
Proceedings of the forty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Decomposing combinatorial auctions and set packing problems
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Approximate Mechanism Design without Money
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation
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We design two computationally-efficient incentive-compatible mechanisms for combinatorial auctions with general bidder preferences. Both mechanisms are randomized, and are incentive-compatible in the universal sense. This is in contrast to recent previous work that only addresses the weaker notion of incentive compatibility in expectation. The first mechanism obtains an O(√m)-approximation of the optimal social welfare for arbitrary bidder valuations -- this is the best approximation possible in polynomial time. The second one obtains an O(log2 m)-approximation for a subclass of bidder valuations that includes all submodular bidders. This improves over the best previously obtained incentive-compatible mechanism for this class which only provides an O(√ m)-approximation.