Bidding and allocation in combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Algorithm for optimal winner determination in combinatorial auctions
Artificial Intelligence
Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
The Communication Complexity of Approximate Set Packing and Covering
ICALP '02 Proceedings of the 29th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming
Iterative Combinatorial Auctions: Theory and Practice
Proceedings of the Seventeenth National Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Twelfth Conference on Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence
On polynomial-time preference elicitation with value queries
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Applying learning algorithms to preference elicitation
EC '04 Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Preference Elicitation and Query Learning
The Journal of Machine Learning Research
Costly valuation computation in auctions
TARK '01 Proceedings of the 8th conference on Theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge
Approximation techniques for utilitarian mechanism design
Proceedings of the thirty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Approximation algorithms for combinatorial auctions with complement-free bidders
Proceedings of the thirty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Combinatorial Auctions
Auction design with costly preference elicitation
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
Exponential communication inefficiency of demand queries
TARK '05 Proceedings of the 10th conference on Theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge
An improved approximation algorithm for combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders
SODA '06 Proceedings of the seventeenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithm
On maximizing welfare when utility functions are subadditive
Proceedings of the thirty-eighth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Truthful randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the thirty-eighth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Approximation algorithms for allocation problems: Improving the factor of 1 - 1/e
FOCS '06 Proceedings of the 47th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
IJCAI'05 Proceedings of the 19th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence
Welfare Maximization in Congestion Games
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
We study the computational power of iterative combinatorial auctions. Most existing iterative combinatorial auctions are based on repeatedly suggesting prices for bundles of items and querying the bidders for their “demand” under these prices. We prove several results regarding such auctions that use a polynomial number of demand queries: (1) that such auctions can simulate several other natural types of queries; (2) that they can approximate the optimal allocation as well as generally possible using polynomial communication or computation, while weaker types of queries cannot do so; (3) that such auctions that use only item prices may solve allocation problems in communication cost that is exponentially lower than the cost incurred by auctions that use prices for bundles. For the latter result, we initiate the study of how prices of bundles can be represented when they are not linear and show that the “default” representation has severe limitations. Our results hold for any series of demand queries with polynomial length, without any additional restrictions on the queries (e.g., to ascending prices).