Probabilistic checking of proofs: a new characterization of NP
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Combinatorial auctions with decreasing marginal utilities
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM conference on Electronic Commerce
Approximation algorithms for combinatorial auctions with complement-free bidders
Proceedings of the thirty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Truthful and Near-Optimal Mechanism Design via Linear Programming
FOCS '05 Proceedings of the 46th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Tight approximation algorithms for maximum general assignment problems
SODA '06 Proceedings of the seventeenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithm
An improved approximation algorithm for combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders
SODA '06 Proceedings of the seventeenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithm
Truthful randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the thirty-eighth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Welfare maximization in congestion games
EC '06 Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Limitations of VCG-based mechanisms
Proceedings of the thirty-ninth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Stochastic packing-market planning
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Searching for the possibility: impossibility border of truthful mechanism design
ACM SIGecom Exchanges
Online budgeted matching in random input models with applications to Adwords
Proceedings of the nineteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
A combinatorial allocation mechanism with penalties for banner advertising
Proceedings of the 17th international conference on World Wide Web
Optimal approximation for the submodular welfare problem in the value oracle model
STOC '08 Proceedings of the fortieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
On characterizations of truthful mechanisms for combinatorial auctions and scheduling
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Item pricing for revenue maximization
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Tight information-theoretic lower bounds for welfare maximization in combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Permutation betting markets: singleton betting with extra information
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Scheduling to maximize participation
Theoretical Computer Science
Maximizing a Submodular Set Function Subject to a Matroid Constraint (Extended Abstract)
IPCO '07 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Integer Programming and Combinatorial Optimization
Santa Claus Meets Hypergraph Matchings
APPROX '08 / RANDOM '08 Proceedings of the 11th international workshop, APPROX 2008, and 12th international workshop, RANDOM 2008 on Approximation, Randomization and Combinatorial Optimization: Algorithms and Techniques
Two Randomized Mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions
APPROX '07/RANDOM '07 Proceedings of the 10th International Workshop on Approximation and the 11th International Workshop on Randomization, and Combinatorial Optimization. Algorithms and Techniques
Cores of cooperative games in information theory
EURASIP Journal on Wireless Communications and Networking - Theory and Applications in Multiuser/Multiterminal Communications
Item pricing for revenue maximization
ACM SIGecom Exchanges
Stepwise randomized combinatorial auctions achieve revenue monotonicity
SODA '09 Proceedings of the twentieth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms
Inapproximability of Combinatorial Public Projects
WINE '08 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
The Balloon Popping Problem Revisited: Lower and Upper Bounds
SAGT '09 Proceedings of the 2nd International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
Approximation Algorithms for Combinatorial Auctions with Complement-Free Bidders
Mathematics of Operations Research
Scheduling to maximize participation
TGC'06 Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Trustworthy global computing
Approximation algorithms for k-duplicates combinatorial auctions with subadditive bidders
COCOA'07 Proceedings of the 1st international conference on Combinatorial optimization and applications
Computation and incentives in combinatorial public projects
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Information inequalities for joint distributions, with interpretations and applications
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
Inapproximability for VCG-based combinatorial auctions
SODA '10 Proceedings of the twenty-first annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
Submodular secretary problem and extensions
APPROX/RANDOM'10 Proceedings of the 13th international conference on Approximation, and 14 the International conference on Randomization, and combinatorial optimization: algorithms and techniques
Approximation schemes for sequential posted pricing in multi-unit auctions
WINE'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Internet and network economics
Approximation algorithms for non-single-minded profit-maximization problems with limited supply
WINE'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Internet and network economics
On the Computational Power of Demand Queries
SIAM Journal on Computing
Multi-unit auctions: beyond roberts
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
A truthful randomized mechanism for combinatorial public projects via convex optimization
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
From convex optimization to randomized mechanisms: toward optimal combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the forty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Truthful randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions
Journal of Computer and System Sciences
Maximizing Non-monotone Submodular Functions
SIAM Journal on Computing
Bayesian incentive compatibility via fractional assignments
Proceedings of the twenty-second annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
On k-column sparse packing programs
IPCO'10 Proceedings of the 14th international conference on Integer Programming and Combinatorial Optimization
Optimization with demand oracles
Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
On competitiveness in uniform utility allocation markets
Operations Research Letters
Maximizing a Monotone Submodular Function Subject to a Matroid Constraint
SIAM Journal on Computing
Quasi-polynomial local search for restricted max-min fair allocation
ICALP'12 Proceedings of the 39th international colloquium conference on Automata, Languages, and Programming - Volume Part I
Online mechanism design (randomized rounding on the fly)
ICALP'12 Proceedings of the 39th international colloquium conference on Automata, Languages, and Programming - Volume Part II
Composable and efficient mechanisms
Proceedings of the forty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Submodular secretary problem and extensions
ACM Transactions on Algorithms (TALG)
The dining bidder problem: à la russe et à la française
ACM SIGecom Exchanges
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We consider the problem of maximizing welfare when allocating m items to n players with subadditive utility functions. Our main result is a way of rounding any fractional solution to a linear programming relaxation to this problem so as to give a feasible solution of welfare at least half that of the value of the fractional solution. This approximation ratio of 1/2 improves over an Ω(1/log m) ratio of Dobzinski, Nisan and Schapira [STOC 2005]. We also show an approximation ratio of 1 - 1/e when utility functions are fractionally subadditive. A result similar to this last result was previously obtained by Dobzinski and Schapira [Soda 2006], but via a different rounding technique that requires the use of a so called "XOS oracle".The randomized rounding techniques that we use are oblivious in the sense that they only use the primal solution to the linear program relaxation, but have no access to the actual utility functions of the players. This allows us to suggest new incentive compatible mechanisms for combinatorial auctions, extending previous work of Lavi and Swamy [FOCS 2005].