Incentive-compatible online auctions for digital goods
SODA '02 Proceedings of the thirteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Maintaining the spirit of the reflection principle when the boundary has arbitrary integer slope
Journal of Combinatorial Theory Series A
Multi-unit auctions with budget-constrained bidders
Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
SODA '05 Proceedings of the sixteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
On profit-maximizing envy-free pricing
SODA '05 Proceedings of the sixteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
AdWords and Generalized On-line Matching
FOCS '05 Proceedings of the 46th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Revenue maximization when bidders have budgets
SODA '06 Proceedings of the seventeenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithm
On maximizing welfare when utility functions are subadditive
Proceedings of the thirty-eighth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Truthful randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the thirty-eighth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Multi-unit auctions with unknown supply
EC '06 Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Balloon Popping With Applications to Ascending Auctions
FOCS '07 Proceedings of the 48th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Item pricing for revenue maximization
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Tight information-theoretic lower bounds for welfare maximization in combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Two Randomized Mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions
APPROX '07/RANDOM '07 Proceedings of the 10th International Workshop on Approximation and the 11th International Workshop on Randomization, and Combinatorial Optimization. Algorithms and Techniques
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We consider the balloon popping problem introduced by Immorlica et al. in 2007 [13]. This problem is directly related to the problem of profit maximization in online auctions, where an auctioneer is selling a collection of identical items to anonymous unit-demand bidders. The auctioneer has the full knowledge of bidders' private valuations for the items and tries to maximize his profit. Compared with the profit of fixed price schemes, the competitive ratio of Immorlica et al.'s algorithm was in the range [1.64, 4.33]. In this paper, we narrow the gap to [1.659, 2].