Competitive auctions and digital goods
SODA '01 Proceedings of the twelfth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Competitive generalized auctions
STOC '02 Proceedings of the thiry-fourth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Truthful approximation mechanisms for restricted combinatorial auctions: extended abstract
Eighteenth national conference on Artificial intelligence
Optimization in the private value model: competitive analysis applied to auction design
Optimization in the private value model: competitive analysis applied to auction design
Multi-unit auctions with budget-constrained bidders
Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
SODA '06 Proceedings of the seventeenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithm
SODA '06 Proceedings of the seventeenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithm
An analysis of alternative slot auction designs for sponsored search
EC '06 Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Optimal delivery of sponsored search advertisements subject to budget constraints
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Allocating online advertisement space with unreliable estimates
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Unconditional competitive auctions with copy and budget constraints
Theoretical Computer Science
Algorithm for stochastic multiple-choice knapsack problem and application to keywords bidding
Proceedings of the 17th international conference on World Wide Web
On the Hardness of Truthful Online Auctions with Multidimensional Constraints
CiE '08 Proceedings of the 4th conference on Computability in Europe: Logic and Theory of Algorithms
Optimal Auctions Capturing Constraints in Sponsored Search
AAIM '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Algorithmic Aspects in Information and Management
The Balloon Popping Problem Revisited: Lower and Upper Bounds
SAGT '09 Proceedings of the 2nd International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
An Online Multi-unit Auction with Improved Competitive Ratio
WINE '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Auctions with revenue guarantees for sponsored search
WINE'07 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Internet and network economics
Budget constrained auctions with heterogeneous items
Proceedings of the forty-second ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Incentive compatible budget elicitation in multi-unit auctions
SODA '10 Proceedings of the twenty-first annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
Bayesian mechanism design for budget-constrained agents
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Unconditional competitive auctions with copy and budget constraints
WINE'06 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Polyhedral clinching auctions and the adwords polytope
STOC '12 Proceedings of the forty-fourth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Optimal auctions via the multiplicative weight method
Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce
| Hi-index | 0.01 |
We study the problem of maximizing revenue for auctions with multiple units of a good where bidders have hard budget constraints, first considered in [2]. The revenue obtained by an auction is compared with the optimal omniscient auction had the auctioneer known the private information of all the bidders, as in competitive analysis [7]. We show that the revenue of the optimal omniscient auction that sells items at many different prices is within a factor of 2 of the optimal omniscient auction that sells all the items at a single price, implying that our results will carry over to multiple price auctions. We give the first auction for this problem, to the best of our knowledge, that is known to obtain a constant fraction of the optimal revenue when the bidder dominance (the ratio between the maximum contribution of a single bidder in the optimal solution and the revenue of that optimal solution) is large (as high as 1/2). Our auction is also shown to remain truthful if canceled upon not meeting certain criteria. On the negative side, we show that no auction can achieve a guarantee of 1/2-ε the revenue of the optimal omniscient multi-price auction. Finally, if the bidder dominance is known in advance and is less than 1/5.828, we give an auction mechanism that raises a large constant fraction of the optimal revenue when the bidder dominance is large and is asymptotically close to the optimal omniscient auction as the bidder dominance decreases. We discuss the relevance of these results for related applications.