Pricing WiFi at Starbucks: issues in online mechanism design
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Multi-unit auctions with budget-constrained bidders
Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Online ascending auctions for gradually expiring items
SODA '05 Proceedings of the sixteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
AdWords and Generalized On-line Matching
FOCS '05 Proceedings of the 46th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Revenue maximization when bidders have budgets
SODA '06 Proceedings of the seventeenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithm
Truthful auctions for pricing search keywords
EC '06 Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Optimal delivery of sponsored search advertisements subject to budget constraints
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
An incentive-compatible multi-armed bandit mechanism
Proceedings of the twenty-sixth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
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This paper assess the prospect of creating truthful mechanisms for sponsored search auctions where advertisers have budget and time constraints. While the existing impossibility in this area by [4] addresses the situation where advertisers have budget limitations and static prices but not time limitations; our result applies to the common setting in practice where advertisers have time and budget limitations, prices are dynamic and advertisers act strategically on their time limitation as well as their budget.We show that in cases where advertisers' arrival and departure times are private information, no truthful deterministic mechanism for budgeted sponsored search with time constrained advertisers can perform well with respect to social welfare maximization. Essentially, to protect itself from advertisers' time manipulation a truthful mechanism must give up significant social welfare.It is also shown that even in cases where advertisers' arrival and departure times are known to the mechanism, the existence of advertiser budgets is itself a problem. In this case a budgeted sponsored search mechanism with time constrained advertisers can not achieve non-trivial welfare approximation when using a local pricing scheme (a player pricing history is not taken into account). Also, it is shown that for a dynamic global pricing scheme no such truthful mechanism exists.