Fast approximation algorithms for fractional packing and covering problems
Mathematics of Operations Research
Randomized rounding without solving the linear program
Proceedings of the sixth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Self-interested automated mechanism design and implications for optimal combinatorial auctions
EC '04 Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Revenue maximization when bidders have budgets
SODA '06 Proceedings of the seventeenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithm
Multi-unit Auctions with Budget Limits
FOCS '08 Proceedings of the 2008 49th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Bayesian algorithmic mechanism design
Proceedings of the forty-second ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Multi-parameter mechanism design and sequential posted pricing
Proceedings of the forty-second ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Budget constrained auctions with heterogeneous items
Proceedings of the forty-second ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Incentive compatible budget elicitation in multi-unit auctions
SODA '10 Proceedings of the twenty-first annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
FOCS '10 Proceedings of the 2010 IEEE 51st Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
An expressive mechanism for auctions on the web
Proceedings of the 20th international conference on World wide web
Bayesian mechanism design for budget-constrained agents
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Polyhedral clinching auctions and the adwords polytope
STOC '12 Proceedings of the forty-fourth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Budget feasible mechanism design: from prior-free to bayesian
STOC '12 Proceedings of the forty-fourth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
An algorithmic characterization of multi-dimensional mechanisms
STOC '12 Proceedings of the forty-fourth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Bayesian optimal auctions via multi- to single-agent reduction
Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
Symmetries and optimal multi-dimensional mechanism design
Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
Optimal Multi-dimensional Mechanism Design: Reducing Revenue to Welfare Maximization
FOCS '12 Proceedings of the 2012 IEEE 53rd Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Mechanism design for a risk averse seller
WINE'12 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
We show that the multiplicative weight update method provides a simple recipe for designing and analyzing optimal Bayesian Incentive Compatible (BIC) auctions, and reduces the time complexity of the problem to pseudo-polynomial in parameters that depend on single agent instead of depending on the size of the joint type space. We use this framework to design computationally efficient optimal auctions that satisfy ex-post Individual Rationality in the presence of constraints such as (hard, private) budgets and envy-freeness. We also design optimal auctions when buyers and a seller's utility functions are non-linear. Scenarios with such functions include (a) auctions with "quitting rights", (b) cost to borrow money beyond budget, (c) a seller's and buyers' risk aversion. Finally, we show how our framework also yields optimal auctions for variety of auction settings considered in Alaei et al and Cai et al, albeit with pseudo-polynomial running times.