Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Mechanisms for complement-free procurement
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Proceedings of the fifth ACM international conference on Web search and data mining
On the approximability of budget feasible mechanisms
Proceedings of the twenty-second annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
Optimizing budget allocation among channels and influencers
Proceedings of the 21st international conference on World Wide Web
Budget feasible mechanism design: from prior-free to bayesian
STOC '12 Proceedings of the forty-fourth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Optimization with demand oracles
Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
Learning on a budget: posted price mechanisms for online procurement
Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
Crowdsourcing to smartphones: incentive mechanism design for mobile phone sensing
Proceedings of the 18th annual international conference on Mobile computing and networking
Privacy auctions for recommender systems
WINE'12 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Optimal auctions via the multiplicative weight method
Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Pricing mechanisms for crowdsourcing markets
Proceedings of the 22nd international conference on World Wide Web
Truthful incentives in crowdsourcing tasks using regret minimization mechanisms
Proceedings of the 22nd international conference on World Wide Web
Weighted graph-based methods for identifying the most influential actors in trust social networks
International Journal of Networking and Virtual Organisations
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We study a novel class of mechanism design problems in which the outcomes are constrained by the payments. This basic class of mechanism design problems captures many common economic situations, and yet it has not been studied, to our knowledge, in the past. We focus on the case of procurement auctions in which sellers have private costs, and the auctioneer aims to maximize a utility function on subsets of items, under the constraint that the sum of the payments provided by the mechanism does not exceed a given budget. Standard mechanism design ideas such as the VCG mechanism and its variants are not applicable here. We show that, for general functions, the budget constraint can render mechanisms arbitrarily bad in terms of the utility of the buyer. However, our main result shows that for the important class of sub modular functions, a bounded approximation ratio is achievable. Better approximation results are obtained for subclasses of the sub modular functions. We explore the space of budget feasible mechanisms in other domains and give a characterization under more restricted conditions.