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Every day millions of crowdsourcing tasks are performed in exchange for payments. Despite the important role pricing plays in crowdsourcing campaigns and the complexity of the market, most platforms do not provide requesters appropriate tools for effective pricing and allocation of tasks. In this paper, we introduce a framework for designing mechanisms with provable guarantees in crowdsourcing markets. The framework enables automating the process of pricing and allocation of tasks for requesters in complex markets like Amazon's Mechanical Turk where workers arrive in an online fashion and requesters face budget constraints and task completion deadlines. We present constant-competitive incentive compatible mechanisms for maximizing the number of tasks under a budget, and for minimizing payments given a fixed number of tasks to complete. To demonstrate the effectiveness of this framework we created a platform that enables applying pricing mechanisms in markets like Mechanical Turk. The platform allows us to show that the mechanisms we present here work well in practice, as well as to give experimental evidence to workers' strategic behavior in absence of appropriate incentive schemes.