A threshold of ln n for approximating set cover
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
The budgeted maximum coverage problem
Information Processing Letters
The Price of Truth: Frugality in Truthful Mechanisms
STACS '03 Proceedings of the 20th Annual Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science
The Value of Knowing a Demand Curve: Bounds on Regret for Online Posted-Price Auctions
FOCS '03 Proceedings of the 44th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
SODA '04 Proceedings of the fifteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
On the computational power of iterative auctions
Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
A multiple-choice secretary algorithm with applications to online auctions
SODA '05 Proceedings of the sixteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Beyond VCG: Frugality of Truthful Mechanisms
FOCS '05 Proceedings of the 46th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
ACM Transactions on Algorithms (TALG)
Matroids, secretary problems, and online mechanisms
SODA '07 Proceedings of the eighteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Auctions for structured procurement
Proceedings of the nineteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Multi-parameter mechanism design and sequential posted pricing
Proceedings of the forty-second ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Submodular secretary problem and extensions
APPROX/RANDOM'10 Proceedings of the 13th international conference on Approximation, and 14 the International conference on Randomization, and combinatorial optimization: algorithms and techniques
FOCS '10 Proceedings of the 2010 IEEE 51st Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Constrained non-monotone submodular maximization: offline and secretary algorithms
WINE'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Internet and network economics
Mechanisms for complement-free procurement
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Improved competitive ratios for submodular secretary problems
APPROX'11/RANDOM'11 Proceedings of the 14th international workshop and 15th international conference on Approximation, randomization, and combinatorial optimization: algorithms and techniques
On the approximability of budget feasible mechanisms
Proceedings of the twenty-second annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
A note on maximizing a submodular set function subject to a knapsack constraint
Operations Research Letters
Pricing mechanisms for crowdsourcing markets
Proceedings of the 22nd international conference on World Wide Web
Truthful incentives in crowdsourcing tasks using regret minimization mechanisms
Proceedings of the 22nd international conference on World Wide Web
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We study online procurement markets where agents arrive in a sequential order and a mechanism must make an irrevocable decision whether or not to procure the service as the agent arrives. Our mechanisms are subject to a budget constraint and are designed for stochastic settings in which the bidders are either identically distributed or, more generally, permuted in random order. Thus, the problems we study contribute to the literature on budget-feasible mechanisms as well as the literature on secretary problems and online learning in auctions. Our main positive results are as follows. We present a constant-competitive posted price mechanism when agents are identically distributed and the buyer has a symmetric submodular utility function. For nonsymmetric submodular utilities, under the random ordering assumption we give a posted price mechanism that is O(log n)-competitive and a truthful mechanism that is O(1)-competitive but uses bidding rather than posted pricing.