Algorithmic mechanism design (extended abstract)
STOC '99 Proceedings of the thirty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Algorithms, games, and the internet
STOC '01 Proceedings of the thirty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
SODA '02 Proceedings of the thirteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
A BGP-based mechanism for lowest-cost routing
Proceedings of the twenty-first annual symposium on Principles of distributed computing
The Price of Truth: Frugality in Truthful Mechanisms
STACS '03 Proceedings of the 20th Annual Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science
Globally Distributed Computation over the Internet - The POPCORN Project
ICDCS '98 Proceedings of the The 18th International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems
Virtual path bandwidth allocation in multi-user networks
INFOCOM '95 Proceedings of the Fourteenth Annual Joint Conference of the IEEE Computer and Communication Societies (Vol. 1)-Volume - Volume 1
Truthful Mechanisms for One-Parameter Agents
FOCS '01 Proceedings of the 42nd IEEE symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
SODA '04 Proceedings of the fifteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
On the expected payment of mechanisms for task allocation
Proceedings of the twenty-third annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
The Price of Stability for Network Design with Fair Cost Allocation
FOCS '04 Proceedings of the 45th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Algorithms for selfish agents mechanism design for distributed computation
STACS'99 Proceedings of the 16th annual conference on Theoretical aspects of computer science
How much can taxes help selfish routing?
Journal of Computer and System Sciences - Special issue on network algorithms 2005
OURS: optimal unicast routing systems in non-cooperative wireless networks
Proceedings of the 12th annual international conference on Mobile computing and networking
ACM Transactions on Algorithms (TALG)
Pricing of partially compatible products
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Frugality ratios and improved truthful mechanisms for vertex cover
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
SODA '07 Proceedings of the eighteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Auctions for structured procurement
Proceedings of the nineteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Optimal mechanism design and money burning
STOC '08 Proceedings of the fortieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Hidden information and actions in multi-hop wireless ad hoc networks
Proceedings of the 9th ACM international symposium on Mobile ad hoc networking and computing
Routing game in hybrid wireless mesh networks with selfish mesh clients
International Journal of Autonomous and Adaptive Communications Systems
Frugal Routing on Wireless Ad-Hoc Networks
SAGT '08 Proceedings of the 1st International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
Optimal collusion-resistant mechanisms with verification
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Simple versus optimal mechanisms
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Algorithmic Game Theory: A Snapshot
ICALP '09 Proceedings of the 36th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming: Part I
Making VCG more robust in combinatorial auctions via sub modular approximation
AAAI'07 Proceedings of the 22nd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 2
Note: Path auctions with multiple edge ownership
Theoretical Computer Science
Refining the Cost of Cheap Labor in Set System Auctions
WINE '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Using nash implementation to achieve better frugality ratios
ISAAC'07 Proceedings of the 18th international conference on Algorithms and computation
False-name-proof mechanisms for hiring a team
WINE'07 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Internet and network economics
On the price of truthfulness in path auctions
WINE'07 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Internet and network economics
Buyer-supplier games: optimization over the core
WAOA'07 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Approximation and online algorithms
Mobicent: a credit-based incentive system for disruption tolerant network
INFOCOM'10 Proceedings of the 29th conference on Information communications
Worst-case efficiency ratio in false-name-proof combinatorial auction mechanisms
Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems: volume 1 - Volume 1
Buyer-games: Optimization over the core
Theoretical Computer Science
Mechanisms for complement-free procurement
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Proceedings of the fifth ACM international conference on Web search and data mining
On the approximability of budget feasible mechanisms
Proceedings of the twenty-second annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
Learning on a budget: posted price mechanisms for online procurement
Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
The stackelberg minimum spanning tree game
WADS'07 Proceedings of the 10th international conference on Algorithms and Data Structures
Commodity auctions and frugality ratios
SAGT'12 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Algorithmic Game Theory
Truthful mechanism design for multidimensional covering problems
WINE'12 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Truthful incentives in crowdsourcing tasks using regret minimization mechanisms
Proceedings of the 22nd international conference on World Wide Web
ACM SIGecom Exchanges
Truthful optimization using mechanisms with verification
Theoretical Computer Science
| Hi-index | 0.02 |
We study truthful mechanisms for auctions in which the auctioneer is trying to hire a team of agents to perform a complex task, and paying them for their work. As common in the field of mechanism design, we assume that the agents are selfish and will act in such a way as to maximize their profit, which in particular may include misrepresenting their true incurred cost. Our first contribution is a new and natural definition of the frugality ratio of a mechanism, measuring the amount by which a mechanism "overpays", and extending previous definitions to all monopoly-free set systems. After reexamining several known results in light of this new definition, we proceed to study in detail shortest path auctions and "r-out-of-k sets" auctions. We show that when individual set systems (e.g., graphs) are considered instead of worst cases over all instances, these problems exhibit a rich structure, and the performance of mechanisms may be vastly different. In particular, we show that the wellknown VCG mechanism may be far from optimal in these settings, and we propose and analyze a mechanism that is always within a constant factor of optimal.