Algorithmic mechanism design (extended abstract)
STOC '99 Proceedings of the thirty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
SODA '02 Proceedings of the thirteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Truthful Mechanisms for One-Parameter Agents
FOCS '01 Proceedings of the 42nd IEEE symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
SODA '04 Proceedings of the fifteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
True costs of cheap labor are hard to measure: edge deletion and VCG payments in graphs
Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Beyond VCG: Frugality of Truthful Mechanisms
FOCS '05 Proceedings of the 46th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
On Scheduling Fees to Prevent Merging, Splitting, and Transferring of Jobs
Mathematics of Operations Research
False-name-proof mechanisms for hiring a team
WINE'07 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Internet and network economics
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In this paper, we study path auction games in which multiple edges may be owned by the same agent. The edge costs and the set of edges owned by the same agent are privately known to the owner of the edges. In this setting, we show that, assuming that edges not on the winning path always get 0 payment, there is no individually rational, strategyproof mechanism in which only edge costs are reported. If the agents are asked to report costs as well as identity information, we show that there is no Pareto efficient mechanism that is false-name proof. We then study a first-price path auction in this model. We show that, in the special case of parallel-path graphs, there is always a Pareto efficient pure strategy @e-Nash equilibrium in bids. However, this result does not extend to general graph; we construct a graph in which there is no Pareto efficient pure strategy @e-Nash equilibrium.