Algorithmic mechanism design (extended abstract)
STOC '99 Proceedings of the thirty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
SODA '02 Proceedings of the thirteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
A BGP-based mechanism for lowest-cost routing
Proceedings of the twenty-first annual symposium on Principles of distributed computing
On Approximating the Longest Path in a Graph (Preliminary Version)
WADS '93 Proceedings of the Third Workshop on Algorithms and Data Structures
Vickrey Prices and Shortest Paths: What is an Edge Worth?
FOCS '01 Proceedings of the 42nd IEEE symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Selfish routing
On Certain Connectivity Properties of the Internet Topology
FOCS '03 Proceedings of the 44th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
SODA '04 Proceedings of the fifteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
On the expected payment of mechanisms for task allocation: [extended abstract]
EC '04 Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Frugality ratios and improved truthful mechanisms for vertex cover
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
SODA '07 Proceedings of the eighteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Parameterized Graph Editing with Chosen Vertex Degrees
COCOA 2008 Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Combinatorial Optimization and Applications
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Average-Case Analyses of Vickrey Costs
APPROX '09 / RANDOM '09 Proceedings of the 12th International Workshop and 13th International Workshop on Approximation, Randomization, and Combinatorial Optimization. Algorithms and Techniques
Note: Path auctions with multiple edge ownership
Theoretical Computer Science
Free-Riding and Free-Labor in Combinatorial Agency
SAGT '09 Proceedings of the 2nd International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
Refining the Cost of Cheap Labor in Set System Auctions
WINE '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
On Economic and Computational-Efficient Resource Pricing in Large Distributed Systems
CCGRID '10 Proceedings of the 2010 10th IEEE/ACM International Conference on Cluster, Cloud and Grid Computing
First-passage percolation on a width-2 strip and the path cost in a VCG auction
WINE'06 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Strategy-Proof dynamic resource pricing of multiple resource types on federated clouds
ICA3PP'10 Proceedings of the 10th international conference on Algorithms and Architectures for Parallel Processing - Volume Part I
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We address the problem of lowering the buyer's expected payments in shortest path auctions, where the buyer's goal is to purchase a path in a graph in which edges are owned by selfish agents. We show that by deleting some of the edges of the graph, one can reduce the total payment of the VCG mechanism by a factor of θ(n). However, we prove that it is NP-hard to find the best subset of edges to delete, even if the edge costs are small integers, or the graph has very simple structure; in the former case, this problem is hard to approximate, too. On the positive side, we describe a pseudopolynomial time algorithm for series-parallel graphs and fixed edge costs. Also, we discuss the applicability of this algorithm for the case of general (probabilistic) costs and derive a general lower bound on the performance of algorithms that are based on expected edge costs.