Algorithmic mechanism design (extended abstract)
STOC '99 Proceedings of the thirty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Bidding and allocation in combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM conference on Electronic commerce
G-commerce: Market Formulations Controlling Resource Allocation on the Computational Grid
IPDPS '01 Proceedings of the 15th International Parallel & Distributed Processing Symposium
Market-based Proportional Resource Sharing for Clusters
Market-based Proportional Resource Sharing for Clusters
BOINC: A System for Public-Resource Computing and Storage
GRID '04 Proceedings of the 5th IEEE/ACM International Workshop on Grid Computing
True costs of cheap labor are hard to measure: edge deletion and VCG payments in graphs
Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Sustaining Incentive in Grid Resource Allocation: A Reinforcement Learning Approach
CCGRID '07 Proceedings of the Seventh IEEE International Symposium on Cluster Computing and the Grid
Strategy proof electronic markets
Proceedings of the ninth international conference on Electronic commerce
A Strategy-proof Pricing Scheme for Multiple Resource Type Allocations
ICPP '09 Proceedings of the 2009 International Conference on Parallel Processing
A taxonomy of rational attacks
IPTPS'05 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Peer-to-Peer Systems
Information Systems Frontiers
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There is growing interest in large-scale systems where globally distributed and commoditized resources can be shared and traded, such as peer-to-peer networks, grids, and cloud computing. Users of these systems are rational and maximize their own interest when consuming and contributing shared resources, even if by doing so they affect the overall efficiency of the system. To manage rational users, resource pricing and allocation can provide the necessary incentives for users to behave such that the overall efficiency can be maximized. In this paper, we propose a dynamic pricing mechanism for the allocation of shared resources, and evaluate its performance. In contrast with several existing trading models, our scheme is designed to allocate a request with multiple resource types, such that the user does not have to aggregate different resource types manually. We formally prove the economic properties of our pricing scheme using the mechanism design framework. We perform both theoretical and simulation analysis to evaluate the economic and computational efficiency of the allocation and the scalability of the mechanism. Our simulations are validated against a prototype implementation on PlanetLab.