On Economic and Computational-Efficient Resource Pricing in Large Distributed Systems
CCGRID '10 Proceedings of the 2010 10th IEEE/ACM International Conference on Cluster, Cloud and Grid Computing
Dynamic Resource Pricing on Federated Clouds
CCGRID '10 Proceedings of the 2010 10th IEEE/ACM International Conference on Cluster, Cloud and Grid Computing
A distributed market framework for large-scale resource sharing
EuroPar'10 Proceedings of the 16th international Euro-Par conference on Parallel processing: Part I
Strategy-Proof dynamic resource pricing of multiple resource types on federated clouds
ICA3PP'10 Proceedings of the 10th international conference on Algorithms and Architectures for Parallel Processing - Volume Part I
The Impact of User Rationality in Federated Clouds
CCGRID '12 Proceedings of the 2012 12th IEEE/ACM International Symposium on Cluster, Cloud and Grid Computing (ccgrid 2012)
A novel dynamic pricing scheme for contributing peers in the VoD system
Multimedia Tools and Applications
Ex-post efficient resource allocation for Self-organizing Cloud
Computers and Electrical Engineering
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Resource sharing on the Internet is becoming increasingly pervasive. Recently, there is growing interest in distributed systems such as peer-to-peer and grid, with efforts being directed towards resource allocation strategies that incentivize users to share resources. While combinatorial auctions can perform multiple resource type allocations, it is computationally a NP-complete problem. Thus, allocation in large distributed resource sharing systems focuses mainly on a single resource type. We propose a strategy-proof, VCG-based resource pricing scheme for resource allocation in dynamic markets where users behave rationally in meeting their own interest. Our mechanism is designed to meet the needs of large distributed systems, delivering the following key properties: multiple resource type allocations, individual rationality, incentive compatibility for both buyers and sellers, budget balance and computational efficiency. Simulation evaluation of our prototype based on a centralized implementation demonstrates the viability of our approach, as compared to both traditional and combinatorial auctions.