Optimal Mechanisms for Single Machine Scheduling
WINE '08 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Coordination mechanisms for selfish scheduling
Theoretical Computer Science
Pricing traffic in a spanning network
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Note: Path auctions with multiple edge ownership
Theoretical Computer Science
Non-monetary fair scheduling: a cooperative game theory approach
Proceedings of the twenty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Parallelism in algorithms and architectures
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A deterministic server is shared by users with identical linear waiting costs, requesting jobs of arbitrary lengths. Shortest jobs are served first for efficiency. The server can monitor the length of a job but not the identity of the job's user, thus merging, splitting, or partially transferring jobs offer cooperative strategic opportunities. Can we design cash transfers to neutralize such manipulations? We prove that mergeproofness and splitproofness are not compatible, and that it is similarly impossible to prevent all transfers of jobs involving three or more agents. On the other hand, robustness against pairwise transfers is feasible and essentially characterizes a one-dimensional set of scheduling methods. This line is borne by two outstanding methods: the merge-proof S+ and the split-proof S-. Splitproofness, unlike mergeproofness, is not compatible with several simple tests of equity. Thus, the two properties are far from equally demanding.