Pricing multi-class network services using the Shapley Value

Authors:
Fan Zhang;Pramode K. Verma
Affiliations:
School of Electrical and Computer Engineering, The University of Oklahoma-Tulsa, Tulsa, USA 74135;School of Electrical and Computer Engineering, The University of Oklahoma-Tulsa, Tulsa, USA 74135
Venue:
Netnomics
Year:
2011

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Abstract

This paper investigates pricing issues in class-based networks. Classes of packets having lower impatience and longer average delay receive monetary compensations. The inter-class price differential is determined by the inter-class compensations. The paper also presents rules for allocating network resource to each class. The corresponding payoff (disutility share) for each class is driven by the Shapley Value of the associated cooperative game.