Contingent Bids in Auctions: Availability, Commitment and Pricing of Computing as Utility
HICSS '04 Proceedings of the Proceedings of the 37th Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences (HICSS'04) - Track 8 - Volume 8
Pricing the internet with multibid auctions
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
An auction mechanism for allocating the bandwidth of networks to their users
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
Stackelberg approach for pricing differentiated services
Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Performance evaluation methodologies and tools
Game theory for cognitive radio networks: An overview
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
ICQT'11 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Internet charging and QoS technologies: economics of converged, internet-based networks
Global Vs. Per-domain monitoring of multi-domain networks
LCN '11 Proceedings of the 2011 IEEE 36th Conference on Local Computer Networks
From quality of experience to willingness to pay for interconnection service quality
IFIP'12 Proceedings of the 2012 international conference on Networking
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Providing Assured-Quality Services over data networks has been a key objective for the past few decades. Research and commercial activities have been focused on several aspects related to this main objective, such as implementing services over heterogeneous networks, providing scalable solutions and verifying network performance. However, less attention has been devoted to the interaction of these technical aspects with the business plane. Although several quality-based pricing schemes have been proposed, reimbursement proposals, while quite common in other scenarios as health, hotel reservation or airlines, are still rare in the field of Internet Economics. In this work, we propose a simple pricing scheme and study it in detail, in order to use Quality of Service monitoring information as feedback to the business plane, with the ultimate objective of improving the seller's revenue. In our framework, Assured-Quality Services are sold through first-price auctions, and in case of failure, a percentage of the price paid for the service is given back to the buyers. We derive the expression for the willingness to pay and we model the reimbursement problem through a zero-sum Stackelberg game. We show that the Nash equilibrium of such game implies reimbursing 100 % in case of failures.