Public access to the Internet
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Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Electronic commerce
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
A new strategy for bidding in the network-wide progressive second price auction for bandwidth
CoNEXT '05 Proceedings of the 2005 ACM conference on Emerging network experiment and technology
A survey on networking games in telecommunications
Computers and Operations Research
Pricing Communication Networks: Economics, Technology and Modelling (Wiley Interscience Series in Systems and Optimization)
Pricing the internet with multibid auctions
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Providing Internet access: what we learn from INDEX
IEEE Network: The Magazine of Global Internetworking
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IEEE Network: The Magazine of Global Internetworking
Auctions for Resource Allocation in Overlay Networks
Network Control and Optimization
Performance of Auctions and Sealed Bids
EPEW '09 Proceedings of the 6th European Performance Engineering Workshop on Computer Performance Engineering
A collusion-resistant mechanism for autonomic resource management in Virtual Private Networks
Computer Communications
Federation of virtualized infrastructures: sharing the value of diversity
Proceedings of the 6th International COnference
Optimizing revenue for bandwidth auctions over networks with time reservations
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
Inter-domain pricing: challenges and possible approaches
International Journal of Network Management
A flexible auction model for virtual private networks
NETWORKING'11 Proceedings of the 10th international IFIP TC 6 conference on Networking - Volume Part II
ICQT'11 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Internet charging and QoS technologies: economics of converged, internet-based networks
Economic co-allocation and advance reservation of network and computational resources in grids
GECON'12 Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Economics of Grids, Clouds, Systems, and Services
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We present a mechanism for auctioning bandwidth on a network-wide basis to end users or ISPs that will utilize it for the same time period. This mechanism consists of a set of simultaneous multi-unit descending-price (i.e. Dutch) auctions, one per link of the network. The per unit prices of bandwidth at the various links are asymmetric, thus reflecting the asymmetry of demand for these links. A user can be instantly allocated bandwidth over a certain path, by simultaneously bidding for the quantity desired at all relevant auctions. This winner determination rule is complemented by a payment rule of the VCG (Vickrey-Clarke-Groves) type, which provides users with the incentive to bid truthfully, thus simplifying bidding. Also, the mechanism enables the auctioneer to use his prior information on market demand anticipated and its spreading among the various links in order to set effectively the auction's parameters. We argue that our mechanism attains nearly efficient allocation of the network's bandwidth (i.e. the resulting social welfare is close to the respective maximum for the quantity decided to be sold by the auctioneer), while it is simple, scalable and applicable to real networks, even for auctioning the capacity of links owned by multiple providers and then splitting the revenue among them. Alternatively, the mechanism offers the provider the opportunity to optimize his revenue, rather than the social welfare. Since our mechanism's computational complexity is low it can serve as a fast, practical, and near-optimal solution to a generally NP-hard optimization problem.