Scheduling independent tasks on uniform processors
SIAM Journal on Computing
Tighter bounds for LPT scheduling on uniform processors
SIAM Journal on Computing
Approximation algorithms for scheduling unrelated parallel machines
Mathematical Programming: Series A and B
The competitiveness of on-line assignments
Journal of Algorithms
Achieving network optima using Stackelberg routing strategies
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
On-line routing of virtual circuits with applications to load balancing and machine scheduling
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Algorithmic mechanism design (extended abstract)
STOC '99 Proceedings of the thirty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Heuristic Algorithms for Scheduling Independent Tasks on Nonidentical Processors
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Algorithms for Scheduling Tasks on Unrelated Processors
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Stackelberg scheduling strategies
STOC '01 Proceedings of the thirty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Tight bounds for worst-case equilibria
SODA '02 Proceedings of the thirteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
How much can taxes help selfish routing?
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Computing Nash equilibria for scheduling on restricted parallel links
STOC '04 Proceedings of the thirty-sixth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Selfish load balancing and atomic congestion games
Proceedings of the sixteenth annual ACM symposium on Parallelism in algorithms and architectures
Optimizing cost and performance for multihoming
Proceedings of the 2004 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communications
Fairness and load balancing in wireless LANs using association control
Proceedings of the 10th annual international conference on Mobile computing and networking
Tolls for Heterogeneous Selfish Users in Multicommodity Networks and Generalized Congestion Games
FOCS '04 Proceedings of the 45th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
User-level performance of channel-aware scheduling algorithms in wireless data networks
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Tradeoffs in worst-case equilibria
Theoretical Computer Science - Approximation and online algorithms
Performance Guarantees of Local Search for Multiprocessor Scheduling
INFORMS Journal on Computing
(Almost) optimal coordination mechanisms for unrelated machine scheduling
Proceedings of the nineteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
On Scheduling Fees to Prevent Merging, Splitting, and Transferring of Jobs
Mathematics of Operations Research
STACS'99 Proceedings of the 16th annual conference on Theoretical aspects of computer science
Coordination mechanisms for selfish scheduling
WINE'05 Proceedings of the First international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Stability and Convergence in Selfish Scheduling with Altruistic Agents
WINE '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Tradeoffs and Average-Case Equilibria in Selfish Routing
ACM Transactions on Computation Theory (TOCT)
On the inefficiency of equilibria in linear bottleneck congestion games
SAGT'10 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Algorithmic game theory
Designing Network Protocols for Good Equilibria
SIAM Journal on Computing
Optimal cost sharing protocols for scheduling games
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Inner product spaces for MinSum coordination mechanisms
Proceedings of the forty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Dynamic inefficiency: anarchy without stability
SAGT'11 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Algorithmic game theory
Local search performance guarantees for restricted related parallel machine scheduling
LATIN'10 Proceedings of the 9th Latin American conference on Theoretical Informatics
The price of anarchy on uniformly related machines revisited
Information and Computation
The price of anarchy for minsum related machine scheduling
WAOA'11 Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Approximation and Online Algorithms
Coordination mechanisms for selfish parallel jobs scheduling
TAMC'12 Proceedings of the 9th Annual international conference on Theory and Applications of Models of Computation
Preemptive coordination mechanisms for unrelated machines
ESA'12 Proceedings of the 20th Annual European conference on Algorithms
Smooth inequalities and equilibrium inefficiency in scheduling games
WINE'12 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Coordination mechanism for selfish scheduling under a grade of service provision
Information Processing Letters
Optimal Cost Sharing for Resource Selection Games
Mathematics of Operations Research
NP-hardness of pure Nash equilibrium in Scheduling and Network Design Games
Theoretical Computer Science
Non-cooperative games on multidimensional resource allocation
Future Generation Computer Systems
Inefficiency of Nash equilibria with parallel processing policy
Information Processing Letters
Altruism in Atomic Congestion Games
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation
Coordination mechanisms from (almost) all scheduling policies
Proceedings of the 5th conference on Innovations in theoretical computer science
Hi-index | 5.23 |
In machine scheduling, a set of jobs must be scheduled on a set of machines so as to minimize some global objective function, such as the makespan, which we consider in this paper. In practice, jobs are often controlled by independent, selfishly acting agents, which each select a machine for processing that minimizes the (expected) completion time. This scenario can be formalized as a game in which the players are job owners, the strategies are machines, and a player's disutility is the completion time of its jobs in the corresponding schedule. The equilibria of these games may result in larger-than-optimal overall makespan. The price of anarchy is the ratio of the worst-case equilibrium makespan to the optimal makespan. In this paper, we design and analyze scheduling policies, or coordination mechanisms, for machines which aim to minimize the price of anarchy of the corresponding game. We study coordination mechanisms for four classes of multiprocessor machine scheduling problems and derive upper and lower bounds on the price of anarchy of these mechanisms. For several of the proposed mechanisms, we also prove that the system converges to a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in a linear number of rounds. Finally, we note that our results are applicable to several practical problems arising in communication networks.