Computing Nash equilibria for scheduling on restricted parallel links
STOC '04 Proceedings of the thirty-sixth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
(Almost) optimal coordination mechanisms for unrelated machine scheduling
Proceedings of the nineteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Atomic congestion games among coalitions
ACM Transactions on Algorithms (TALG)
Altruism, selfishness, and spite in traffic routing
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Efficient coordination mechanisms for unrelated machine scheduling
SODA '09 Proceedings of the twentieth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms
Coordination mechanisms for selfish scheduling
Theoretical Computer Science
Theoretical Computer Science
Non-clairvoyant Scheduling Games
SAGT '09 Proceedings of the 2nd International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
Convergence time to Nash equilibria
ICALP'03 Proceedings of the 30th international conference on Automata, languages and programming
Nashification and the coordination ratio for a selfish routing game
ICALP'03 Proceedings of the 30th international conference on Automata, languages and programming
STACS'99 Proceedings of the 16th annual conference on Theoretical aspects of computer science
Strong price of anarchy for machine load balancing
ICALP'07 Proceedings of the 34th international conference on Automata, Languages and Programming
Social context in potential games
WINE'12 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Convergence of best-response dynamics in games with conflicting congestion effects
WINE'12 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Altruism in Atomic Congestion Games
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation
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In this paper we consider altruism, a phenomenon widely observed in nature and practical applications, in the prominent model of selfish load balancing with coordination mechanisms. Our model of altruistic behavior follows recent work by assuming that agent incentives are a trade-off between selfish and social objectives. In particular, we assume agents optimize a linear combination of personal delay of a strategy and the resulting social cost. Our results show that even in very simple cases a variety of standard coordination mechanisms are not robust against altruistic behavior, as pure Nash equilibria are absent or better response dynamics cycle. In contrast, we show that a recently introduced Time-Sharing policy yields a potential game even for partially altruistic agents. In addition, for this policy a Nash equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time. In this way our work provides new insights on the robustness of coordination mechanisms. On a more fundamental level, our results highlight the limitations of stability and convergence when altruistic agents are introduced into games with weighted and lexicographical potential functions.