Coordination mechanisms

  • Authors:
  • George Christodoulou;Elias Koutsoupias;Akash Nanavati

  • Affiliations:
  • Max-Planck-Institut für Informatik, Saarbrücken, Germany;Department of Informatics, University of Athens, Greece;Computer Science Department, University of California Los Angeles, Los Angeles, CA 90095, United States

  • Venue:
  • Theoretical Computer Science
  • Year:
  • 2009

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Abstract

We introduce the notion of coordination mechanisms to improve the performance in systems with independent selfish and non-colluding agents. The quality of a coordination mechanism is measured by its price of anarchy-the worst-case performance of a Nash equilibrium over the (centrally controlled) social optimum. We give upper and lower bounds for the price of anarchy for selfish task allocation and congestion games.