The ecology of computation
Rules of encounter: designing conventions for automated negotiation among computers
Rules of encounter: designing conventions for automated negotiation among computers
Economic models for allocating resources in computer systems
Market-based control
AAAI '98/IAAI '98 Proceedings of the fifteenth national/tenth conference on Artificial intelligence/Innovative applications of artificial intelligence
Algorithmic mechanism design (extended abstract)
STOC '99 Proceedings of the thirty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Sharing the cost of muliticast transmissions (preliminary version)
STOC '00 Proceedings of the thirty-second annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Approaches to winner determination in combinatorial auctions
Decision Support Systems - Special issue on information and computational economics
Computationally feasible VCG mechanisms
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Some Tractable Combinatorial Auctions
Proceedings of the Seventeenth National Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Twelfth Conference on Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence
A Market Protocol for Decentralized Task Allocation
ICMAS '98 Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Multi Agent Systems
Computationally Manageable Combinatorial Auctions
Computationally Manageable Combinatorial Auctions
Taming the computational complexity of combinatorial auctions: optimal and approximate approaches
IJCAI'99 Proceedings of the 16th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence - Volume 1
STACS'99 Proceedings of the 16th annual conference on Theoretical aspects of computer science
Automated Negotiation and Decision Making in Multiagent Environments
EASSS '01 Selected Tutorial Papers from the 9th ECCAI Advanced Course ACAI 2001 and Agent Link's 3rd European Agent Systems Summer School on Multi-Agent Systems and Applications
Theoretical Computer Science
Bounding the payment of approximate truthful mechanisms
ISAAC'04 Proceedings of the 15th international conference on Algorithms and Computation
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Many recent applications of interest involve self-interested participants. As such participants, termed agents, may manipulate the algorithm for their own benefit, a new challenge emerges: The design of algorithms and protocols that perform well when the agents behave according to their own self-interest. This led several researchers to consider computational models that are based on a sub-field of game-theory and micro-economics called mechanism design. This paper introduces this topic mainly through examples.It demonstrates that in many cases selfishness can be satisfactorily overcome, surveys some of the recent trends in this area and presents new challenging problems. The paper is mostly based on classic results from mechanism design as well as on recent work by the author and others.