Random pseudo-polynomial algorithms for exact matroid problems
Journal of Algorithms
Improved approximations for the Steiner tree problem
SODA selected papers from the third annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Combinatorial optimization
Algorithmic mechanism design (extended abstract)
STOC '99 Proceedings of the thirty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
A 1.598 approximation algorithm for the Steiner problem in graphs
Proceedings of the tenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Improved Steiner tree approximation in graphs
SODA '00 Proceedings of the eleventh annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
A new approximation algorithm for the Steiner tree problem with performance ratio 5/3
Journal of Algorithms
Algorithms, games, and the internet
STOC '01 Proceedings of the thirty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
SODA '02 Proceedings of the thirteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
An approximate truthful mechanism for combinatorial auctions with single parameter agents
SODA '03 Proceedings of the fourteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
The Price of Truth: Frugality in Truthful Mechanisms
STACS '03 Proceedings of the 20th Annual Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science
Algorithms for Rational Agents
SOFSEM '00 Proceedings of the 27th Conference on Current Trends in Theory and Practice of Informatics
Truthful Mechanisms for One-Parameter Agents
FOCS '01 Proceedings of the 42nd IEEE symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
SODA '04 Proceedings of the fifteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Approximation techniques for utilitarian mechanism design
Proceedings of the thirty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Frugality ratios and improved truthful mechanisms for vertex cover
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Hidden information and actions in multi-hop wireless ad hoc networks
Proceedings of the 9th ACM international symposium on Mobile ad hoc networking and computing
Refining the Cost of Cheap Labor in Set System Auctions
WINE '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
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In a STACS 2003 paper, Talwar analyses the overpayment the VCG mechanism incurs for ensuring truthfulness in auction Among other results, he studies k-Set Cover (given a universe U and a collection of sets S1, S2, ..., Sq , each having a cost c(Si) and at most k elements of U, find a minimum cost subcollection, called cover, whose union equals U) and shows that the payment of the optimum cover OPT is at most kc(OPT′), where OPT′ is the best cover disjoint from the optimum cover For k ≥ 3, k-Set Cover is known to be NP-Hard, and thus truthful mechanisms based on approximation algorithms are desirable We show that the payment incurred by two approximation algorithms (including the Greedy algorithm) is bounded by (k – 1) c(OPT) + kc(OPT′) The same approximation algorithms have payment bounded by k (c(OPT) + c(OPT′) ) when applied to more general set systems, which include k-Polymatroid Cover, a problem with applications in Steiner Tree computations If q is such that an element in a k-Set-Cover instance appears in at most q sets, we show that the payment of our algorithms is bounded by qk2 times the payment of the optimum algorithm.