Algorithmic mechanism design (extended abstract)
STOC '99 Proceedings of the thirty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Computationally feasible VCG mechanisms
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Local search heuristic for k-median and facility location problems
STOC '01 Proceedings of the thirty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Algorithms, games, and the internet
STOC '01 Proceedings of the thirty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
SODA '02 Proceedings of the thirteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Sharing the cost of multicast transmissions
Journal of Computer and System Sciences - Special issue on Internet algorithms
An approximate truthful mechanism for combinatorial auctions with single parameter agents
SODA '03 Proceedings of the fourteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Iterative Combinatorial Auctions: Theory and Practice
Proceedings of the Seventeenth National Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Twelfth Conference on Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence
Truthful approximation mechanisms for restricted combinatorial auctions: extended abstract
Eighteenth national conference on Artificial intelligence
Truthful Mechanisms for One-Parameter Agents
FOCS '01 Proceedings of the 42nd IEEE symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Coalitional games on graphs: core structure, substitutes and frugality
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Proceedings of the 9th annual international conference on Mobile computing and networking
Approximation techniques for utilitarian mechanism design
Proceedings of the thirty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Online auctions with re-usable goods
Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Collusion-resistant mechanisms for single-parameter agents
SODA '05 Proceedings of the sixteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Beyond VCG: Frugality of Truthful Mechanisms
FOCS '05 Proceedings of the 46th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
How much can taxes help selfish routing?
Journal of Computer and System Sciences - Special issue on network algorithms 2005
ACM Transactions on Algorithms (TALG)
Pricing of partially compatible products
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Frugality ratios and improved truthful mechanisms for vertex cover
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
SODA '07 Proceedings of the eighteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Auctions for structured procurement
Proceedings of the nineteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Optimal mechanism design and money burning
STOC '08 Proceedings of the fortieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Hidden information and actions in multi-hop wireless ad hoc networks
Proceedings of the 9th ACM international symposium on Mobile ad hoc networking and computing
Frugal Routing on Wireless Ad-Hoc Networks
SAGT '08 Proceedings of the 1st International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
Simple versus optimal mechanisms
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Auction in multi-path multi-hop routing
IEEE Communications Letters
Refining the Cost of Cheap Labor in Set System Auctions
WINE '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Using nash implementation to achieve better frugality ratios
ISAAC'07 Proceedings of the 18th international conference on Algorithms and computation
False-name-proof mechanisms for hiring a team
WINE'07 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Internet and network economics
On the price of truthfulness in path auctions
WINE'07 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Internet and network economics
Generalized second price auction in multi-path routing with selfish nodes
GLOBECOM'09 Proceedings of the 28th IEEE conference on Global telecommunications
On the approximability of budget feasible mechanisms
Proceedings of the twenty-second annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
Bounding the payment of approximate truthful mechanisms
ISAAC'04 Proceedings of the 15th international conference on Algorithms and Computation
Learning on a budget: posted price mechanisms for online procurement
Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
Commodity auctions and frugality ratios
SAGT'12 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Algorithmic Game Theory
ACM SIGecom Exchanges
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The celebrated Vickrey-Clarke-Grove(VCG) mechanism induces selfish agents to behave truthfully by paying them a premium. In the process, it may end up paying more than the actual cost to the agents. For the minimum spanning tree problem, if the market is "competitive", one can show that VCG never pays too much. On the other hand, for the shortest s-t path problem, Archer and Tardos [5] showed that VCG can overpay by a factor of 驴(n). A natural question that arises then is: For what problems does VCG overpay by a lot? We quantify this notion of overpayment, and show that the class of instances for which VCG never overpays is a natural generalization of matroids, that we call frugoids. We then give some sufficient conditions to upper bound and lower bound the overpayment in other cases, and apply these to several important combinatorial problems. We also relate the overpayment in an suitable model to the locality ratio of a natural local search procedure.